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ABSTRACT 
China’s military capabilities are growing and so is Beijing’s ability to employ its 
military in diplomatic capacities. Since the Chinese military’s power projection 
capabilities still remain limited, the preponderance of its activities still fall within Asia. 
This thesis uses a three-step process (comparing, analyzing and extracting implications) 
to assess if increased levels of Chinese military diplomacy will shift the Sino-U.S. 
military relationship towards competition, cooperation, or conflict. This research effort 
finds that differences in U.S. and Chinese capabilities and political interests lead 
disparities in military diplomacy activity level, selection of strategic partners, and 
preferred diplomacy tools. However, despite these differences, the potential for increased 
Sino-U.S. military cooperation remains high. In order to capitalize on such potentials, 
policymakers should endorse a contingent-based cooperative approach to building 
military-to-military relations between the United States and China. This type of an 
approach encourages China to become more of a “responsible stakeholder” and exert 
positive influence in Asia through its military interactions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are improving. 
One facet of improvement is the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) ability to function as 
an instrument of diplomacy. The PLA’s diplomatic efforts are increasingly evident in 
Asia. These efforts have potential implications for American interests and so deserve 
attention.  
The U.S. military currently conducts diplomatic engagements in Asia with many 
of the same countries with which the PLA interacts. In addition, the expanding scope of 
PLA diplomatic activities overlaps with current U.S. efforts in activity type. This thesis 
attempts to compare the U.S. military and the PLA’s diplomatic activities in Asia in order 
to assess the impact of these activities on future military-to-military relations between the 
United States and China.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
The 2008 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) declares that China is “one 
ascendant state with the potential for competing with the United States.” The NDS goes 
on to state that the United States should “hedge against China’s growing military 
modernization and the impact of its strategic choices upon international security.”1 
China’s strategic choices have always received significant attention. In recent years, 
some Western observers have increased their attention on China’s growing use of 
diplomacy as a tool of engagement to advance its strategic choices. 
Scholars such as Philip Saunders attribute China’s new global activism to goals 
for securing inputs for the economy, protecting against a potential U.S. containment 
strategy, expanding Chinese political influence, and pursuing Chinese commercial 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2008), 2. 
 2
interests.2 According to Saunders, China is using diplomacy to expand its influence in 
Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.3 Other scholars—such as Bates Gill, 
author of Rising Star, and Joshua Kurlatzick, author of Charm Offensive--make similar 
observations.4 
The PLA is an instrument of PRC diplomacy. As Kristen Gunness indicates in her 
paper “China’s Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change,” the Chinese leadership 
considers the PLA’s conduct of foreign military relations to be an activity that supports 
Beijing’s strategic agenda.5 In this view, PRC leadership sees the PLA’s overseas 
military activities as support for political and strategic objectives, not freestanding 
military initiatives conducted explicitly for defense purposes.6  
Washington should consider the possible implications of PLA diplomacy for 
American interests in order to adjust its own military diplomacy. Examining the types of 
PLA diplomatic activity, the countries it engages, and the nature of its established 
relationships may yield recommendations on how to counter Chinese activities that 
hinder American interests on one hand, and on the other hand, enhance stability and the 
chances for cooperation between U.S. and Chinese militaries where they do not. Since 
both countries are likely to continue using the military as a tool of diplomacy, the logical 
approach is to examine the context of the two countries’ military diplomacy activities to 
derive insight on how to execute future endeavors best. 
Asia is an important developing region. The developing countries in this region 
play an increasingly important role in issues such as energy security or alliance building. 
Therefore, creating favorable environments in this region has tremendous value.  
                                                 
2 Phillip C. Saunders, “China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools,” October 2006, 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP4.pdf (accessed August 2, 2008), 6. 
3 Ibid., 2. 
4 Bates Gill, Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Instituion 
Press, 2007); Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Softpower Is Transforming the World 
(Binghampton: Vail-Ballou Press, 2007). 
5 Kristen Gunness, “China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change,” June 20, 2006, 
www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/gunnesspaper.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008), 2. 
6 David Finkelstein, Engaging DoD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations with the United States 
(Alexandria: The CNA Corporation, 1999), vii. 
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The PRC is using diplomacy to create such favorable environments through 
increasing activism. Military diplomacy is a component of China’s overall diplomacy and 
is, consequently, worth examining. This thesis seeks a better understanding of how PLA 
diplomacy affects U.S. military diplomacy in Asia. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Some important questions have been researched to complete this thesis project. 
These questions frame the approach to answering how the PLA’s military diplomacy in 
Asia affects U.S. military efforts in the same region. The questions fall into three 
categories: policy objectives, military diplomacy, and military relations. 
• Policy objectives:  
• What are the foreign policy objectives of the United States and 
China? 
• What are the broader roles that each country’s military plays in the 
pursuit of these goals? 
• Military diplomacy: 
• What are the roles of U.S. and Chinese military diplomacy in 
achieving foreign policy objectives?  
• How do the U.S. and Chinese militaries carry out their respective 
diplomacy efforts? 
• At what levels are diplomatic engagements taking place? 
• Military relations:  
• What is the current atmosphere of Sino-U.S. military relations? 
• What major factors influence the current relationship? 
This thesis concludes that while the military diplomacy objectives of the Chinese 
and U.S. militaries overlap and can lead to a degree of competition, the patterns of 
engagement and overarching security interests of both countries present opportunities for 
increased cooperation.  
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to assess how U.S. and Chinese military diplomacy activities abroad 
influence the relationship between the two countries, one must first understand what the 
foreign policy objectives of each country are. The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) 
issued in the name of the president, and the Strategic Plan published by the Department 
of State (DoS), provide direction for U.S. foreign policy. The current objectives are listed 
as: 
• Champion aspirations for human dignity; 
• Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks 
against us and our friends; 
• Work with others to defuse regional conflicts; 
• Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD); 
• Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free 
trade; 
• Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the 
infrastructure of democracy; 
• Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global 
power; 
• Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges 
and opportunities of the twenty-first century; and 
• Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization.7 
Based on these objectives, DoS acts as the lead agency for implementation. DoS 
publishes a Strategic Plan on how to support the policy positions set forth by the 
president in the NSS. The Strategic Plan “presents how the Department of State and 
USAID will implement U.S. foreign policy and development assistance.”8 According to 
the Strategic Plan, the current DoS objectives are:  
 
                                                 
7 President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 2006 ), 1. 
8 United States Department of State, Security, Democracy, Prosperity; Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 
2004-2009 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Press, 2003), preface. 
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• Achieve peace and security; 
• Advance sustainable development and global interests; 
• Promote international understanding; and 
• Strengthen diplomatic and program capabilities.9 
Once the NSS and Strategic Plan provide foreign policy guidance through stated 
objectives, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) direct how 
military diplomacy supports U.S foreign policy objectives. This direction is regulated by 
objectives published in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Military 
Strategy (NMS). Currently, the NDS outlines five objectives to “support the NSS and 
provide enduring security for the American people.”10 These objectives are: 
• Defend the homeland; 
• Win the Long War (against terrorism); 
• Promote security; 
• Deter conflict; and 
• Win our nation’s wars.11 
In addition to the NDS objectives, the NMS also establishes three supporting 
military objectives:  
• Protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; 
• Prevent conflict and surprise attack; and 




                                                 
9 United States Department of State, Security, Democracy, Prosperity; Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 
2004-2009, 6-38. 
10 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2008), 6. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Government Press, 2004), 9. 
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Ultimately, the role of military diplomacy that emerges from the objectives 
outlined by the NSS, Strategic Plan, NDS, and NMS, is to support U.S. foreign policy by 
shaping a global environment that promotes security and deters conflict through building 
alliances, diffusing regional conflicts, promoting international understanding, and 
strengthening diplomatic and program capabilities.  
Beijing uses a similar process to prescribe the objectives of PLA diplomacy. The 
Communist Party of China (CPC) guides the direction of Chinese foreign policy. 
According to Beijing, the basic objectives of Chinese foreign policy “center on 
safeguarding national independence and state sovereignty, and creating an international 
environment favorable to its reform, opening and modernization efforts, as well as 
maintaining world peace and promoting common development.”13 The CPC constitution 
further states that the CPC “adheres to an independent foreign policy of peace, follows 
the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of opening up, and pushes for 
the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.”14 Specific 
objectives of Chinese foreign policy outlined by the 17th National Congress of the CPC 
include: 
• Conforming to the trend of history and safeguarding mankind's common 
interests; 
• Establishing a new international political and economic order based on 
fairness and reason; 
• Safeguarding world diversity, advocating democracy with respect to 
international relations and diversified patterns of development; 
• Opposing all forms of terrorism; 
• Improving and developing relations with developed countries, prioritizing 
the interests of all peoples irrespective of social or ideological differences, 
expanding common interests, and solving disputes on the Five Principles 
of Peaceful Coexistence; 
                                                 
13 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America, Main Characteristics of 
China's Foreign Policy, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/zgwjzc/t35077.htm (accessed August 17, 
2008). 
14 Communist Party of China, Constitution of the Communist Party of China, November 14, 2002, 
http://www.learnworld.com/COURSES/P141/CCP-Constitution-Nov-2002.html (accessed September 12, 
2008). 
 7
• Strengthening good-neighborly relations with surrounding countries and 
fostering regional cooperation as friends and partners; 
• Strengthening unity and cooperation with developing countries, building 
up mutual understanding, trust and support, widening the areas of 
cooperation; and 
• Actively participating in multilateral diplomatic activities, playing a 
vigorous role in the UN and other international and regional organizations, 
and supporting efforts to safeguard the legitimate rights of developing 
countries.15 
The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs implements the foreign policy guidance set 
forth by the CPC. “China's independent foreign policy of peace” is the Foreign Ministry’s 
plan for carrying out CPC guidance. The objectives of the Policy of Peace are to: 
• Preserve China's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
• Create a favorable international environment for China's reform, opening 
up and modernizing construction; and 
• Maintain world peace and propel common development. 
After the CPC and Foreign Ministry establishes foreign policy guidelines, the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) guides the military diplomacy role of the PLA. The 
2006 PRC Defense White Paper advertises the role of military diplomacy as “fostering a 
security environment conducive to China's peaceful development.” According to the 
“National Defense Policy” section of the Defense White Paper, the PLA: 
• Maintains military contacts with other countries on the basis of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; 
• Develops cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-
confrontational and not directed against any third party; 
• Takes part in international security cooperation, strengthens strategic 
coordination and consultation with major powers and neighboring 
countries; 
• Conducts bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises; 
• Promotes the establishment of just and effective collective security 
mechanisms and military confidence-building mechanisms; 
                                                 
15 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 17th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China Press Center, October 7, 2007, 
http://english.cpcnews.cn/92249/92259/6277921.html (accessed August 17, 2008). 
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• Works with other countries to prevent conflicts and wars; 
• Stands for effective disarmament and arms control that are just, 
reasonable, comprehensive and balanced in nature; 
• Opposes nuclear proliferation, and endeavors to advance the process of 
international nuclear disarmament; 
• Observes the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, honors its 
international obligations, and participates in UN peacekeeping operations, 
international counter-terrorism cooperation and international disaster relief 
operations; and 
• Plays an active part in maintaining global and regional peace and 
stability.16 
The CPC, Foreign Ministry, and CMC policies frame objectives for PLA 
diplomacy. In examining these policies, military diplomacy objectives can be generally 
summed up as strengthening China’s ability to preserve sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, creating a favorable international environment for China's economic growth, 
and expanding Chinese participation in shaping the world’s security environment.  
After extracting and assessing U.S. and Chinese military diplomacy objectives 
from the governing polices of the respective countries, this thesis focuses on how 
respective objectives are translated into action and how these actions affect Sino-U.S. 
relations. Research conducted in this area yielded limited literature dedicated to the 
subject. Existing works do not directly address the subject of this thesis and generally fall 
into one of three categories—military modernization, diplomacy effectiveness, and Sino-
U.S. military relations. The military modernization category concentrates on evolving 
PLA military capabilities in terms of hardware, doctrine, and budget. The diplomatic 
competence category elaborates on the waxing of Chinese and waning of U.S. diplomacy 
clout from the foreign policy or political perspective. The military relations category 
outlines how the United States and China engage each other and other countries, but  
 
 
                                                 
16 People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China's Defense White Paper 
2006, December 29, 2006, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html#2 (accessed August 
17, 2008). 
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stops short of conducting comparisons between U.S. and Chinese military relations 
abroad or drawing conclusions about how such engagements with other countries directly 
affect Sino-U.S. military relations.  
The evolution of China’s military capability has received tremendous attention in 
recent years. Observers extensively scrutinize areas such as the growth of China’s 
military budget, modernizations in the PLA’s hardware, and evolution in Chinese 
military doctrine.17 They further speculate on the implications of these recent military 
developments on Sino-U.S. Relations18 and on China’s role in the world order.19 
Also receiving attention in recent years is how Beijing is becoming increasingly 
savvy in using “soft power” to advance its goals.20 Books such as Bates Gill’s Rising Star 
and Joshua Kurlantzick’s Charm Offensive all conclude that China increasingly favors 
diplomacy as the tool of choice to advance Beijing’s foreign policy.21 As Kurlantzick 
states:  
 
                                                 
17 For an overview of the latest military developments in PLA capabilities and strategies, see Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, “Military Power of the People's Republic of China,” Annual Report to Congress 
(2008); Dennis J. Blasko, “Observations on Military Modernization and International Influence–An 
Alternate View,” A Paper Prepared for the National Defense University Conference on China's Global 
Activism: Implications for U.S. Security Interests (National Defense University, June 20, 2006); for the 
latest figures in PLA budeget changes, see Zhu Zhe, “China Daily: Defense Budget to Rise by 17.6 
Percent,” Open Source Center, March 5, 2008, 
https://www.opensource.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS (accessed March 13, 2008). 
18 Jonathan D. Pollack, “Chinese Military Power: What Vexes the United States and Why?,” Orbis, 
(Fall 2007): 635-650.  
19 For discussions on China’s role in the international order, see Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and 
Andrew Small, “China's New Dictatorship Democracy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?,” Foreign Affairs 
(January/February 2008): 38; James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders, “Visions of Order: Japan and 
China in U.S. Strategy,” Strategic Forum (National Defense University), June 2006. 
20 Joseph Nye first coined the term and said, “Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences 
of others...It is leading by example and attracting others to do what you want.” He excluded using elements 
like investment, trade and formal diplomacy as a part of soft power because he considered them more 
concrete carrots and sticks. However, scholars have started to use the term in broader contexts that include 
economic, diplomatic and aid activities. The term is used in this broader context here. 
21 Bates Gill, Rising Star: China's New Security Diplomacy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Instituion 
Press, 2007); Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Softpower Is Transforming the World 
(Binghampton: Vail-Ballou Press, 2007); Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand 
Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice,” The China Quarterly (December 2001): 835-864; 
Congressional Research Service, “China's Foreign Policy and “Soft Power” in South America, Asia, and 
Africa, Report for Congress (Washington, 2008). 
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The ultimate test of a country’s influence is its ability to create a string of 
friends around the world; great powers build relationships spanning 
continents. China has begun creating an alternative pole to Western 
democracies in international organizations and global diplomacy.22 
Beijing has definitively become increasingly proficient in wielding diplomacy, 
and for good reason.23 Some observers point to significant increases in international 
exchanges and involvement by Beijing that are starting to challenge U.S. hegemony.24  
In addition, some experts have noted China’s concurrent rise in military and 
diplomatic clout and focus on how China is employing the military as a diplomacy tool to 
advance its foreign policy.25 Kristen Gunness at CNA points out that PLA diplomacy 
plays an integral part in Beijing’s foreign policy implementation.26 PLA experts such as 
Kenneth Allen have documented the type and frequency of diplomatic activities the PLA 
has participated in abroad.27 These analyses spotlight the fact that Chinese military 
diplomacy activities are on the increase and warrant a respective increase in attention.  
Despite these efforts, the literature dedicated specifically to Chinese military 
diplomacy still remains limited in scope and depth. Existing works do not clearly address 
how U.S. and PLA military diplomacy affects the two militaries’ relationship with each 
                                                 
22 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World (Yale 
University Press, 2007), 146. 
23 For excellent discussions on the increased use of diplomacy, see Yiwei Wang, “Public Diplomacy 
and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power,” The Annuals of The American Academy of Political and Social 
Science (March 2008); Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, “China's New Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 
(November/December 2003): 22-35; Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asian Perspectives on the China Challenge,” 
The Journal of Strategic Studies (August–October 2007): 809-830; Hugo Restall, “China's Bid for Asian 
Hegemony,” Far Eastern Economic Review (May 2007): 10-14. 
24 See Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, “Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China's 
Response to U.S. Hegemony,” Journal of Strategic Studies (December 2006): 962-968. 
25 For discussions on how the PLA acts as a diplomacy tool, see Kristen Gunness, “China's Military 
Diplomacy in an Era of Change,” June 20, 2006, 
www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/gunnesspaper.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008); multiple Kenneth 
Allen papers including Kenneth Allen, PLA Diplomacy in Asia: Content and Consequences (Alexandria: 
The CNA Corporation); Kenneth Allen, China's Foreign Military Relations: 2003-2004 (Alexandria: The 
CNA Corporation). 
26 Kristen Gunness, “China's Military Diplomacy in an Era of Change,” June 20, 2006, 
www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/gunnesspaper.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008), 2. 
27 Kenneth W. Allen is a Senior Analyst of the China Studies Center at The CNA Corporation. He has 
written extensively on the PLA including titles such as “PLA Diplomacy in Asia,” “China’s Foreign 
Military Relations,” and “PLA Air Force Foreign Relations.”  
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other. Scholars have examined Sino-U.S. military relations only in the instance of direct 
engagements between the PLA and the U.S. military.28 The general conclusion is that 
bilateral military relations have still fully not recovered since cutting off contact after the 
Tiananmen crackdown in 1989.29  
The limited literature on Chinese military diplomacy is particularly noticeable 
with respect to the PLA’s diplomacy efforts in Asia and its impacts on U.S. military 
diplomacy in the same region. These inadequacies indicate that this thesis fills an 
important gap.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of Chinese and U.S. military 
diplomacy efforts since 2001 by examining each country’s military diplomatic activities 
in Asia. The comparison assesses differences in overall activity levels, countries of focus, 
activity types, and levels of engagement. The independent variable is PLA diplomatic 
activities, and the dependent variable is U.S. military diplomacy activities. 
The period of examination starts in 2001 because the year marked an obvious 
shift in Beijing’s approach to foreign policy. Since 2001, China has significantly 
expanded its global activism.30 As Phillip Saunders States, “Beijing has taken advantage 
of opportunities created by the U.S. focus on terrorism, the unpopularity of some 
American policies (especially in the Muslim world), and by relative U.S. neglect of Latin 




                                                 
28 For an overview on Sino-U.S. military to military relations, see Shirley A. Kan, U.S.-China Military 
Contacts: Issues for Congress, Report for Congress (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2008). 
29 Shirley Kan, U.S-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, 2007). 
30 For details on the evolution of China’s strategic objectives, see Phillip C. Saunders, “China's Global 
Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools,” October 2006, 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP4.pdf (accessed August 2, 2008). 
31 Ibid., 2. 
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relatively attractive to developing countries who are “willing to cooperate in quiet efforts 
to defend the principle of sovereignty, resist U.S. attempts to assert a right to democratic 
governance, and oppose U.S. intervention.”32 
The types of military diplomacy engagements are grouped into four categories, 
each with associated activities:  
• Strategic-level activities 
• Defense consultations and strategic dialogues 
• Arms transfers 
• Military exchanges 
• Regional activities 
• State-to-State military protocols 
• Participation in military exercises 
• Participation in regional forums 
• Professional military education exchanges  
• Sending officers abroad 
• Receiving foreign officers 
• Cooperation with other nations in non-traditional security areas 
• Counter-terrorism cooperation 
• Peacekeeping operations 
• Disaster relief / crises response operations 
These categories serve as the framework for organizing the activities that 
constitute military diplomacy.33  
Asia is selected as the region of study because Washington and Beijing both 
actively engage the countries in this region on different levels and through different types 
of military-related activities. While focusing on specific Asian countries as case studies 
                                                 
32 For details on the evolution of China’s strategic objectives, see Phillip C. Saunders, “China's Global 
Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools,” October 2006, 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP4.pdf (accessed August 2, 2008), 6. 
33 These categories are outlined by Kristen Gunness. See Kristen Gunness, “China's Military 
Diplomacy in an Era of Change,” June 20, 2006, 
www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2006/gunnesspaper.pdf (accessed March 1, 2008). 
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may enhance the focus on the depth of study, doing so would preclude an accurate 
comparison of the diplomatic activities conducted by U.S. and Chinese militaries across 
the region. 
This thesis uses a combination of primary and secondary sources from both U.S. 
and Chinese publications along with U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Theater 
Security Cooperation records to extract accurate representations of the military 
diplomacy activities of each country. Publications come from a blend of government, 
media, and scholarly documents.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. This chapter is the introduction. Chapter 
II summarizes and compares raw data reflecting the activities of both militaries. Chapter 
III analyzes the trends that emerge from the comparison of activities. Chapter IV assesses 
the implications the activities have on increasing the potential for competition, 
cooperation or conflict between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. Finally, the Conclusion 
chapter offers a summary of findings and policy recommendations, and suggests areas for 
further study.  
Chapter II consolidates and compares data reflecting the military diplomacy 
activities of the U.S. and Chinese militaries. This comparison reveals disparities in three 
particular areas—the overall activity level, engagement partners, and diplomatic tools of 
choice. In surveying the overall military diplomacy level, this research project found that 
the volume of U.S. military activities far exceeds that of its Chinese counterparts. In the 
realm of engagement partners, political interests provided dense security ties between the 
U.S. military and Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The PLA 
maintained similar close-knit defense-centric relationships with Pakistan, Russia, Burma 
and North Korea. In the effort to sustain security relationships, the U.S. military took a 
well-balanced approach to exercising all the tools available under the umbrella of military 
diplomacy. The PLA efforts were less diverse and particularly challenged the U.S. 
military in conducting defense consultations and strategic dialogues, state-to-state 
military protocols, participation in regional forums, and peacekeeping operations.  
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Chapter III addresses the differences described above in detail by examining the 
reasons for such differences. The chapter offers three suggestions. First, the overall 
military diplomacy activity level disparity between the U.S. and Chinese militaries is 
attributed to disproportions in military capabilities between the two forces. The U.S. 
military affords the United States power projection capabilities commensurate with that 
of a superpower. The PLA simply cannot match such capabilities and consequently 
resorts to more limited objectives. Second, barring significant shifts in political climates 
or readjustment of military diplomacy efforts, the national interests binding the security 
relationships between the U.S. and Chinese militaries and their respective security 
partners will mostly likely continue to hold current relationships in place. With the 
exception of Thailand and Pakistan, most U.S. or Chinese strategic partners appear to be 
deeply rooted in their security relationships with either the U.S. military or the PLA. 
Third, there is no immediate threat to U.S. military diplomacy efforts in Asia because the 
United States’ widespread capacity to conduct military diplomacy in the region still 
surpasses that of the PLA. While the PLA’s efforts are notable in some diplomatic 
activities, the U.S. military is still dominating most diplomatic relationships. 
Chapter IV assesses the implications that differences in defense diplomacy have 
on the future of military-to-military relations between the United States and China. The 
assessment finds that while the context created by current activities and relationships can 
offer persuasive supporting evidence for competition, cooperation and conflict, the 
evidence for improved cooperation appears most predominant. The reasoning is that 
although competition can offer marginal benefits by improving relationships with specific 
nations, associated negative consequences vis-à-vis increased threat perceptions negate 
net gains in enhancing net influence. Furthermore, even though conflict over central 
security differences can arise, either the United States or China stands to benefit from 
conflict. On the other hand, regional cooperation through conducting collective military 
diplomacy affords both countries the opportunity to enhance stability in the region and 
consolidate influence throughout Asia. The costs and benefits associated with 
competition, cooperation or conflict should, therefore, logically lead to increased 
cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. 
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The concluding chapter offers policy recommendations and suggests directions 
for further study. This thesis recommends a policy approach consistent with former 
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s concept of encouraging China to become 
more of a “responsible stakeholder.” In the spirit of this concept, the United States should 
promote a contingent-based cooperative military-to-military relationship with the PLA. 
The basis of the relationship would be to cooperate with the PLA in order to afford China 
increasing opportunities to exert influence through military diplomacy. Cooperation will, 
of course, be contingent upon China’s ability to increasingly demonstrate responsible 
behavior in conducting defense interactions, an area in which the PLA is already making 
progress. 
In recommending further areas for study, this thesis proposes two specific tracks. 
The first track would be to better measure the effectiveness of military diplomacy by 
associating weighted values with specific military diplomacy tools. The purpose would 
be to measure the effective impact of military diplomacy more accurately by taking into 
consideration the perceived needs and desires of partner countries. The second track 
would be to reconsider the future of PLA diplomacy activities and implications for 
cooperation with the U.S. military against the backdrop of the current global economic 
slowdown. The PLA’s shrinking resources and increasing potential role to maintain 
domestic stability at home, caused by the economic downturn, may alter previous 
estimations regarding military diplomacy activities. These alterations may have important 
implications and, hence, are worth researching. 
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II. MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN ASIA 
Asia is a region where both the U.S. military and the PLA actively engage in a 
robust number and variety of military diplomatic activities. China’s limited power 
projection capabilities may limit the role of the PLA to a minor tool of influence outside 
Asia, but PLA military capabilities matter greatly inside the region.34 According to the 
U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Theater Security Cooperation Management 
Information System (TSCMIS), the U.S. military consistently conducted over 1,000 
military-to-military contacts each year from 2001 to 2007 with countries in its area of 
responsibility (AOR). The type of activities employed in these contacts range from 
education exchange to non-traditional security cooperation. The PRC’s military 
diplomacy activities, while also wide-ranging, fell short in volume when compared to 
U.S. activities. This chapter examines which Asian countries the U.S. military and the 
PLA interacted with and through what venues the interactions took place. The 
comparative assessment reveals both common ground and dissimilarities. In general, both 
militaries interacted with almost all Asian countries but each had idiosyncrasies regarding 
methods and frequency of engagements. While the U.S. military had particularly high 
levels of exchanges with select security partners and engaged Asian countries through a 
fairly well-balanced employment of methods, the PLA showed more consistency in 
activity level from country to country and predominantly interacted through high-level 
exchanges and regional forums.  
A. ENGAGEMENT PATTERNS 
Both the U.S. and Chinese militaries regularly engaged the majority of the 
countries in Asia. A list of Asian countries each military interacted with is in Table 1 
below. Although both countries sustained military relations with most Asian countries,  
 
 
                                                 
34 Phillip C. Saunders, “China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools,” October 2006, 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Occasional_Papers/OCP4.pdf (accessed August 2, 2008), 10. 
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there were some differences in engagement patterns. These differences stemmed from the 
level of interactions between respective militaries with the militaries of individual Asian 
countries. 
Table 1.   Countries of Engagement 
COUNTRY U.S. ENGAGEMENT CHINA ENGAGEMENT 
Bangladesh Yes Yes 
Brunei Darussalam Yes Yes 
Bhutan Yes No 
Cambodia Yes Yes 
D.P.R.K (North Korea) Yes* Yes 
India Yes Yes 
Indonesia Yes Yes 
Japan Yes Yes 
Kazakhstan Yes Yes 
Kyrgyzstan Yes Yes 
Laos Yes Yes 
Malaysia Yes Yes 
Mongolia Yes Yes* 
Myanmar (Burma) Yes* Yes 
Nepal Yes Yes 
Pakistan Yes Yes 
Philippines Yes Yes 
ROK Yes Yes 
Russia Yes Yes 
Singapore Yes Yes 
Sri Lanka Yes Yes 
Taiwan Yes No 
Tajikistan Yes Yes 
Turkmenistan Yes No 
Thailand Yes Yes 
Timor-Leste Yes Yes 
Uzbekistan Yes Yes 
Viet Nam Yes Yes 
  * - Indicates sparse engagement from year to year and zero engagement in some years. 
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In assessing the level of interactions, the first evident observation is that the U.S. 
military conducted a higher volume of military diplomacy activities than the PLA. In 
comparisons year after year, the U.S. military activity level far exceeded that of the PLA. 
Consequently, in addition to comparing the volume of military diplomatic activities each 
country conducted, an assessment of how each country exercised each engagement tool is 
also necessary for deriving patterns in methods of engagement. 
Looking beyond the numbers of engagements, the U.S. military and PLA both 
had noticeable voids in military relations activities with certain countries. China did not 
have any military interactions with Taiwan, Bhutan or Turkmenistan. China does not 
have military relations with Taiwan for political reasons, as it does not recognize Taiwan 
as a sovereign nation. This point of contention aside, Bhutan and Turkmenistan were the 
only variances where the United States maintained military relations with a select country 
and China did not. Apart from these three countries, both the United States and China 
also had instances of only maintaining sporadic engagements with certain countries. For 
the United States, these countries include North Korea and Burma. The United States had 
three military-to-military contacts with North Korea in 2005 but none in 2006 or 2007. 
With Burma, the United States had five military-to-military contacts between 2005 and 
2006 but contact discontinued in 2007. China on the other hand, maintains active military 
relationships with both North Korea and Burma. In China’s case, military engagements 
with Mongolia barely managed to register with only one contact in 2005. In contrast, the 
United States maintained a highly active level of military activities with Mongolia.  
Just as there are noticeable voids in activity level with select countries, both the 
United States and China had a high volume of military engagement with certain 
countries. For the United States, Japan and South Korea consistently ranked in the top 
two positions for participating in the most number of activities with the U.S. military. 
Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines normally occupied the third, fourth and fifth 
places.35 For China, the margins for the top positions were smaller. The countries with 
the highest volume of engagement were Pakistan and Russia.  
                                                 
35 See Appendix B for breakdown of TSCMIS yearly assessments.  
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B. ENGAGEMENT TOOLS 
Even though the U.S. and Chinese militaries exercised common tools of 
engagement during the practice of military diplomacy in Asia, there was a discernable 
gap between how often each country employed particular engagement tools. The United 
States took a fairly well balanced approach and interacted with Asian countries using 
tools from each of the four categories of engagement: strategic-level activities, regional 
activities, PME exchanges, and non-traditional security cooperation. The U.S. military 
especially emphasized high-level visits, PME exchanges, bi-lateral/multi-lateral 
conferences, and joint exercises and training events. China demonstrated a more limited 
approach to military diplomacy by predominantly enhancing security relationships 
through regional activities such as regional forums and through and high-level official 
visits or exchanges. 
1. Strategic-level Activities 
The first category of activities is strategic engagements. Activities that fall under 
this category include defense consultations and strategic dialogues, arms transfers, and 
military exchanges. The United States and China both consistently promoted military 
relations with Asian countries through these activities.  
In the realm of defense consultations and strategic dialogues, the U.S. military 
engaged almost all Asian countries through holding bilateral/multi-lateral conferences. 
The number of instances varied from country to country. From 2005 to 2007, Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines ranked highest in the number of 
occurrences with averages of more than forty conferences per year. Burma, Bhutan and 
Timor-Leste had the lowest averages with the number of occurrences hovering in the low 
single digits per annum. North Korea was the only country with which the U.S. military 




China also took a very comprehensive approach in this area. From 2003 to 2006, 
China held defense consultations with Indonesia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Russia and Vietnam. However, 
the average number of consultations and dialogues China held with respective countries 
were very low—usually ranging from one to two each year.36 
In conducting arms transfers, the United States demonstrated a larger and broader 
scale of activities. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIPRI), the United States conducted arms transfers to the countries of Brunei, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand in the period from 2001 to 2007. Of these countries, 
Japan, South Korean, Taiwan, Pakistan and Singapore, in particular, received the largest 
quantities of arms from the United States.37  
China’s arms transfer activities were far less copious. During the same period, 
Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand received arms 
transfers from China. The majority of China’s arms transfers were to Bangladesh and 
Burma.38 
Under the final strategic level activity of military exchanges, the U.S. military 
maintained constant relationships with a higher number of Asian countries.39 Bhutan, 
Burma, Laos, and North Korea were the only four countries that the U.S. military did not 
actively participate in consistent exchanges with.40  
China appeared to be less comprehensive in its participation in military-to-
military exchanges. The PRC Defense White Papers listed all military-to-military 
                                                 
36 People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China's National Defense in 
2006, December 29, 2006, http://www/fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html#2 (accessed August 
17, 2008); People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense 
in 2004, December 2004, http://china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm (accessed August 17, 2008). 
37 See Appendix A.A for U.S. arms transfer details. 
38 See Appendix A.B. for Chinese arms transfer details. 
39 For the purposes of this research effort, military exchanges equate to military-to-military contacts 
that exclude high-level visits. High-level visits will be accounted for under state-to-state military protocols 
in a later segment.  
40 See Appendix B for breakdown of TSCMIS yearly assessments. 
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contacts including high-level visits as military exchanges. After eliminating such visits, 
military exchanges were limited to ten countries—Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand.41  
2. Regional Activities  
Military engagements that classify as regional activities include state-to-state 
military protocols, participation in joint military exercises or training events, and 
participation in regional forums. The similarity in engagement patterns among these three 
types of activities varied drastically. While both the U.S. and Chinese militaries 
conducted extensive state-to-state military protocols with most of the countries in Asia, 
the U.S. military conducted a larger number of joint military exercises with a greater 
number of partners. In contrast, the PLA demonstrated more regional involvement via 
regional forums. 
In state-to-state military protocols, both Washington and Beijing conducted 
military exchanges with the majority of Asian countries. The U.S. military held 
consistent recurring high-level visits with every country except for Bhutan, Burma, Laos, 
North Korea, Russia, and Timor-Leste. China was more active in conducting state-to-
state military protocols from the perspective of the number of countries engaged. Bhutan 
and Taiwan, with whom the PRC has no military relations, were the only two countries 
that China did not engage through formal military protocols.42  
The large number of joint exercises and training activities the U.S. military 
accomplished in Asia overshadowed similar PLA activities. The disparity was not only 
evident in the number of countries respective militaries cooperated with, but also in the 
number of total occurrences from year to year. The U.S. military participated in joint 
military exercises and training events with all Asian countries except five—Bhutan, 
                                                 
41 People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China's National Defense in 
2006, December 29, 2006, http://www/fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html#2 (accessed August 
17, 2008); People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense 
in 2004, December 2004, http://china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm (accessed August 17, 2008). 
42 Assessment based on number of “high-level” visits tracked by PACOM in TSCMIS, and China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its annual publication of China’s Foreign Affairs. 
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Burma, Laos, North Korea, and Timor-Leste. There were hundreds of joint exercises or 
training events each year between U.S. and host Asian countries. The highest numbers of 
incidents usually involved South Korea and Japan with the number of events ranging 
from 40 to 50 and 30 to 40 per year with the respective countries. By contrast, since 
2001, China has only conducted eleven joint exercises or training events in Asia and with 
only a limited number of partners. See Table 2 for the list of joint exercises, which have 
occurred in Asia and that the PLA has participated in. According to a Xinhua article, it 
was not until 2002 that “China set the principle of gradual participation in multilateral 
military exercises to broaden its security cooperation with other countries.”43 In Asia, 
these countries, thus far, include India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, and Thailand. Exercise themes were mostly limited to search and rescue or 
anti-terrorism.  
Table 2.   China’s Joint Military Exercises with Asian Countries Since 2001 
DATE EXERCISE COUNTRIES INVOLVED 
2002 Anti-terrorist Exercise China, Kyrgyzstan 
August 2003 Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
Exercise—“Coalition 2003” 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan 
October 2003 Sino-Pakistani Search and Rescue Exercise China, Pakistan 
November 2003 Sino-Indian Naval Exercise China, India 
August 2004 Sino-Pakistani Counter-Terrorism Exercise China, Pakistan 
August 2005 Peace Mission 2005 China, Russia 
November 2005 Sino-Pakistani Search and Rescue Exercise China, Pakistan 
December 2005 Sino-Indian Search and Rescue Exercise China, India 
December 2005 Sino-Thai Search and Rescue Exercise China, Thailand 
September 2006 Sino-Tajikistani Counter-Terrorism Exercise 
–”Cooperation 2006” 
China, Tajikistan 
December 2006 Sino-Pakistani Counter-Terrorism 
Exercise—“Friendship 2006” 
China, Pakistan 
March 2007 Multilateral Maritime Exercise of WPNS  
July 2007 “Strike2007” Joint Army Training in Special 
Operations 
China, Thailand 
August 2007 Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
Exercise—“Peace Mission2007” 
China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan 
December 2007 “Hand-in-Hand2007” Joint Counter-
terrorism Training 
China, India 
                                                 
43 Lixi Dong and Ran Rong, “Joint Military Drills Draw Attention Worldwide,” China Facts and 
Figures, December 14, 2003, http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/82438.htm (accessed 
December 21, 2008). 
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The PRC possessed a distinct advantage over the United States in Asian regional 
forums participation. China was an active member of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO), multiple forums involving the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), and other regional forums as well. The SCO served as a platform for 
symposiums, agreements and cooperation on anti-terrorism related issues between China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In addition, China engaged 
other Asian countries including Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam through the 10+3 (ASEAN plus China, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea) and 10+1 (ASEAN plus China) forums. These forums 
were used as venues to conduct security talks on numerous occasions. China also 
participated in the East Asian Summit (EAS) in 2005. EAS included the 10+3 members 
and India, Australia and New Zealand. The 10+3, 10+1, and EAS forums all served as 
vehicles for non-traditional security issues.44 Additional Asian forums that China 
participated in included the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Conference on Interaction 
and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Council on Security Cooperation in 
the Asia- Pacific Region (CSCAP), and Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD). 
Participation in Asian regional forums by the United States was less active. The only 
forum that the United States had membership status in was ARF, which includes 
numerous non-Asian members such as Canada, the European Union (EU), and Australia. 
The U.S. also participates in a couple of other forums such as NEACD and CSCAP, but 
in total, China is still more involved in Asia via regional forums. 
3. Professional Military Education Exchanges 
The United States and China both routinely sent military officers abroad and 
received foreign military officers through various education exchange programs 
including PME, seminars, and symposiums. Both countries appeared to have maintained 
healthy levels of activities in this field. The difference was in the principal direction of  
 
                                                 
44 Department of Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affaris, People's Republic of China, China's 
Foreign Affairs 2006 Edition (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2006), 36. 
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information flow. The U.S. military was more entrenched in the business of propagating 
education rather than receiving. The PLA, on the other hand, appeared to exert more 
analogous efforts between propagating and receiving education. 
Both the U.S. and Chinese militaries sent officers abroad, but the scope of 
activities the officers participated in, while abroad, was not equally stout. U.S. officers 
not only received education abroad, but also led training for foreign militaries. In 
receiving education, U.S. military officers attended PME in Asian partner nations 
including India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.45 In propagating 
education, U.S. military officers were sent abroad to teach seminars on topics such as 
medicine, law, logistics, and security.46  
The PLA only sent officers abroad to receive education. According to China’s 
2004 Defense White Papers, the PLA in recent years, “has sent over 1,000 military 
students to more than 20 countries, and 19 military colleges and universities in China 
have established inter-collegiate exchange relations with their counterparts in 25 
countries.”47 The numbers increased slightly in the two following years. As the 2006 
Defense White papers reported, “Over 500 military personnel have been dispatched to 
study in more than 20 countries.”48 
In addition to actively sending officers abroad, both the United States and China 
also received officers from various foreign countries through its military education 
institutions. For the U.S. military, these institutions were located both in the contingent 
United States (CONUS) and abroad in regional centers. In the CONUS, foreign officers 
                                                 
45 United States Air Force Personnel Command, “Intermediate/Senior Developmental Education 
Programs,” Officer Developmental Education, May 2, 2008, 
http://ask.afpc.randolph.af.mil/main_content.asp?prods1=1&prods2=244&prods3=246&p_faqid=6025 
(accessed November 12, 2008). 
46 Detailed yearly activities with individual countries can be found on the IMET website at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/ (December 13, 2008). 
47 People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 
2004, December 2004, http://china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm (accessed August 17, 2008). 
48 The PLA did not provide detailed breakdowns by country of where officers were sent. The only 
information available came from the “Military Exchanges and Cooperation” section of the 2006 Defense 
White papers - People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China's National 
Defense in 2006, December 29, 2006, http://www/fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/wp2006.html#2 
(accessed August 17, 2008). 
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attended academic institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate School, Army Command 
and General Staff Officer College, Naval War College, Air Force Air Command and 
Staff College, and Air Force Squadron Officer School. In addition, foreign officers also 
attended training courses specific to specialty skills such as languages, logistics, and 
parachuting. Outside of CONUS, the U.S. military received foreign officers at its regional 
training centers including the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii and the 
George C. Marshal Center in Germany.49 While attending U.S.-operated schools and 
training centers, foreign military members studied and trained side-by-side with U.S. 
counterparts. 
The PLA also received a large number of foreign officers at its various academic 
institutions. From 2003 to 2004, 1,245 military personnel from 91 countries studied in 
Chinese military colleges and universities. Moreover, “officers from 44 of these countries 
have participated in the fifth and sixth International Symposium Course hosted by the 
PLA National Defense University.”50 The volume of foreign officers studying in China 
increased in the 2005 to 2006 period. During this time, over 2,000 military personnel 
from more than 140 countries studied in military schools.51 One difference to note on 
foreign military members studying in China is that they are often isolated and are not 
mainlined with PLA counterparts during education or training. 
4. Non-traditional Security Cooperation  
The span of non-traditional security cooperation encompasses activities 
surrounding counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. Within these 
activities, the behaviors of the U.S. and Chinese militaries demonstrated both similarities 
and differences. First, with respect to counter-terrorism activities, both militaries showed 
increased activity levels, albeit with different partners. Second, in peacekeeping 
                                                 
49 Detailed yearly activities with individual countries can be found on the IMET website at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/ (December 13, 2008). 
50 People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 
2004, December 2004, http://china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/index.htm (accessed August 17, 2008). 
51 People's Republic of China Information Office of the State Council, China's National Defense in 
2006; RAND Corporation, “Definig U.S. Interests in Central Asia,” 2005, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG338.pdf (accessed November 12, 2008). 
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operations within Asia, China demonstrated higher levels of commitment. Finally, while 
both countries showed activism in supporting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
efforts, the U.S. military not only had higher levels of involvement in each country, it 
was also involved in more countries. 
Counter-terrorism cooperation activities dramatically increased after 2001. For 
the U.S. military, the events of September 11, 2001 clearly increased the focus on 
counter-terrorism. Actions that precipitated from the new focus on counter-terrorism 
included setting up substantial operations in Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbekistan, and Manas, 
Kyrgyzstan to support OEF operations. The U.S. military also conducted a smaller 
refueling missions based out of Ashqabad, Turkmenistan.52 In addition to these measures, 
the U.S. military introduced multiple counter-terror training programs at home and 
abroad, conducted Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines under the leadership of Joint 
Task Force (JTF) 510, and strengthened cooperative relationships with countries such as 
India, Indonesia and Pakistan. 
China was also very active in proliferating counter-terrorism measures. According 
to China’s 2002 Defense White Papers, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan founded the SCO in June of 2001. In June of the following 
year, the heads of state of the six countries signed three important legal and political 
documents—the Charter of the SCO, the Agreement on a Regional Anti-Terrorist Agency 
and the Declaration of the Heads of State of the SCO Member Countries at the SCO St. 
Petersburg Summit.53 In 2004, “the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure was brought 
into operation.”54 Also in 2004, “China held the fourth meeting of the China-Russia 
Counter-Terrorism Working Group.”55 
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In the realm of conducting peacekeeping operations in Asia, China has the distinct 
advantage by traditional accounting standards. These standards do not account for U.S. 
forces in South Korea as peacekeepers. In 2006, the United States still had approximately 
35,000 U.S. troops serving in South Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea 
agreements and U.N. authority. Although this was technically “peacekeeping,” U.S. troop 
deployment to South Korea has long been counted as a standard U.S. forward presence.56 
This accounting anomaly aside, the U.S. military had no peacekeeping presence in Asia. 
By 2004, very few U.S. military personnel were involved with peacekeeping worldwide. 
A report to Congress in 2006 indicated that only twenty-eight U.S. military personnel 
were serving in five UN peacekeeping or related operations, none of which was in Asia.57  
In contrast, China had a significant military commitment to peacekeeping in Asia. 
China vigorously advertises the PLA’s involvement in peacekeeping operations. Beijing 
often highlights that of the five permanent members of the United Nations’ Security 
Council, China provides the largest number of peacekeeping forces. While the majority 
of Chinese peacekeeping forces were deployed to Africa, a notable number—899 PLA 
troops—were also dispatched within Asia. China’s 2004 and 2006 defense White Papers 
indicated that 800 troops and ninety-seven observers were in Cambodia operating under 
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). The remaining two were 
observers of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT).58   
The U.S. military participated in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
operations on a larger scale. The U.S. forces conducted operations with higher frequency 
and in more countries than the PLA. In addition to being involved in the relief efforts 
after all major natural disasters, the U.S. military also conducted scores of other missions. 
PACOM TSCMIS records indicated that the highest number of interactions occurred with 
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Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines and Viet Nam. The instances of cooperation 
from 2005 to 2007 alone totaled thirty-nine with Cambodia, thirty-three with Indonesia, 
twenty-five with Laos, forty-two with the Philippines, and thirty-two with Viet Nam.59  
China’s involvement in similar operations occurred on a much smaller scale. The 
2004 Defense White papers did not even reference such activities. This changed in the 
2006 publication where the PLA was described as actively participating in international 
disaster relief efforts. The document stated that the PLA contributed to disaster relief in 
Asia by supporting rescue operations after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquakes 
in Pakistan and Indonesia. In addition, the PLA has also “conducted search and rescue 
operations, provided medical assistance, and provided relief materials to disaster stricken 
countries.”60 Beijing stopped short of elaborating on a specific number of occurrences, 
which judging from detailed accounts of other numbers, may be an indication of a lower 
level of involvement.  
5. Summary 
Both the United States and PRC have conducted wide arrays of military 
diplomacy activities throughout Asia since 2001. In conducting a comparative assessment 
of such activities, the most apparent observation was that the PLA’s volume of overall 
diplomacy activities fell short of similar U.S. efforts. Beyond this trend, both militaries 
displayed unique preferences for methods and regularities of engagements. Examining 
both U.S. and PRC records on military diplomacy since 2001 also revealed additional 
patterns. U.S. activities exhibited three distinctive characteristics. First, the U.S. military 
engagement efforts extended to all Asian countries. Second, the engagement efforts were 
executed through diversified activities with a well-balanced employment between all 
tools of engagement. Third, the frequency of military diplomacy activities was especially 
high among select security partners such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and 
the Philippines. 
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The PLA also engaged most of the Asian countries by conducting a wide range of 
activities. Although the quantity of activities was not as robust as the U.S. levels, there 
were still some definitive patterns surrounding activity choices. First, state-to-state 
military protocols and counter-terrorism cooperation received particular emphasis as the 
tools of choice for fostering military-to-military relations. Second, the PLA surpassed the 
U.S. military in some activities.   
Table 3 below offers a comparative advantage overview across all military 
diplomacy activities this project examined. Overall, U.S. military diplomacy efforts 
showed greater potency in the majority of activities. However, the PLA did demonstrate 
aptitude for two particular activities—participating in regional forums and peacekeeping 
operations. The PLA also showed competency equivalent to the U.S. military in the 
realms of participating security consultations and dialogues, and conducting state-to-state 
military protocols. These instances suggest that while the U.S. military may still have the 
overall military diplomacy advantage in Asia (from an activity volume perspective), the 
PLA does have footholds in limited activities and is also capable of keeping up with the 
U.S. military in others.  
Table 3.   Comparative Advantage across All Activities 







Strategic     
Consultations and 
Strategic Dialogues 
  X Equal efforts 
Arms Transfers X   Larger Scale and more 
occurrences 
Military Exchanges X   Engagement with more 
countries 
Regional     
State-to-State 
Military Protocols 
  X Equal efforts 
Joint Exercises or 
Training Events 
X   Far more occurrences 
Regional Forums  X  More membership, more 
involvement 
PME Exchange     
Send Abroad X   Learn and teach 
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Counter-Terrorism X   Higher levels of 
commitment, e.g. basing 
Peacekeeping  X  No U.S. presence in Asia 
Humanitarian 
Assistance 
X   Larger scale operations 
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III. GENERAL TRENDS ANALYSIS 
The previous chapter highlighted differences and similarities by conducting a 
comparative assessment of U.S. and PRC military diplomatic activities. The assessment 
yielded some general trends. First, the scale of operations in the realm of military 
diplomacy was drastically different—U.S. activity levels far exceeded that of 
corresponding Chinese efforts. Second, while both militaries interacted broadly with 
Asian countries, each had conspicuous preferences for maintaining security relationships 
with particular countries—the United States had high levels of defense-centric 
involvements with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, while 
China showed relative preferences for Pakistan, Russia, Burma, and North Korea. Third, 
the United States and China each employed specific diplomatic tools to varying extents—
the U.S. military dominated in all diplomatic activities except for four: consultations and 
strategic dialogues; state-to-state military protocols; regional forum participation; and 
peacekeeping operations. This chapter analyzes the above-mentioned trends more closely 
in order to explore potential explanations for the variations and examine how these trends 
may affect the future of U.S. military diplomacy efforts in Asia. The examination 
concludes that differences in overall activity level can be attributed to differences in 
military capabilities; that national interests drive preferences for engagement partners; 
and that there is no immediate threat to U.S. military diplomacy in Asia because the U.S. 
capacity to conduct military diplomacy in the region still exceeds that of the PLA. 
There are four sections in this chapter. The first section attempts to draw a link 
between U.S. and Chinese military capabilities and differences in overall military 
diplomacy activity levels. The second section closely examines the context surrounding 
individual military-to-military relationships between the U.S. and PLA forces and their 
respective preferred partners. The third section assesses the military diplomacy venues in 
which the United States did not dominate and estimate the possible implications. Finally, 
the fourth takes note of some important points to contemplate in calculating the impact of 
military diplomacy.  
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A. OVERALL ACTIVITY LEVEL DISPARITY 
As noted in the previous chapter, the most glaring difference between U.S. and 
Chinese military diplomacy in Asia stems from the different levels of activities between 
the two countries. The sheer volume of U.S. military diplomacy easily overshadows 
similar Chinese efforts in a parallel comparison. This disparity in activity levels results 
from the superpower capabilities of the United States, which is more effective than the 
PLA in facilitating wide-ranging military diplomacy activities. 
The term “superpower” was coined in 1944 by William T. R. Fox, an American 
foreign policy professor, in his book The Superpowers: The United States, Britain and 
the Soviet Union—Their Responsibility for Peace. Fox identified superpowers as states 
that occupied the highest status in the world because they could challenge and fight each 
other on a global scale. In 2005, Alice Miller, a leading China expert and professor at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, further defined superpower as “a country that has the 
capacity to project dominating power and influence anywhere in the world, and 
sometimes, in more than one region of the globe at a time, and so may plausibly attain the 
status of global hegemon.” According to Miller, the basic components of superpower 
stature may be measured along four axes: economic, military, political, and cultural (or 
“soft”).61 With respect to the above definitions, the PLA’s capabilities certainly do not 
entitle the PRC to superpower status. 
While China’s military modernization has made significant strides, improvement 
of its capabilities are limited. China’s military modernization efforts appear to be 
consumed with pursuing “selective pockets of excellence.” In Miller’s view, these 
priorities are: 
• Acquiring “green water” naval and air support capacities to defend 
China’s coastal provinces, now the geographic backbone of China’s 
industrial economy 
• Establishing credible military capacities to win conflicts quickly and 
decisively on China’s long land borders in Asia, where China still has 
several unresolved boundary disputes 
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• Defending China in what is arguably the most heavily militarized region 
in the world, which includes five of the world’s seven declared nuclear 
states (as well as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, all of which could 
rapidly develop nuclear weapons, and North Korea, which may already 
have them) 
• Compelling resolution of the Taiwan question either politically or by 
outright military force—even in the event of American intervention on 
Taipei’s behalf—as well as Chinese claims in the South China Sea (the 
Spratly Islands) on terms acceptable to Beijing 
• Preserving the credibility of China’s second-strike nuclear deterrent 
against a strategic first strike62 
Developing robust military diplomacy capabilities, even though a possible emphasis for 
the PLA, does not appear to be a top “selective pocket of excellence” of the PLA.63 
As a superpower, the United States projects a great amount of influence in Asia 
through the use of its military. As a baseline, the U.S. military has a significant presence 
based in Japan and South Korea. According to the September 2007 DoD active duty 
military personnel strength figures, there were 32,803 and 27,014 military personnel 
stationed in Japan and South Korea respectively. In addition, there were 12,278 troops 
afloat on U.S. Naval assets in the East Asia and Pacific region.64 Moreover, the U.S. 
military also had significant numbers of troops in Thailand (96), Philippines (95), 
Singapore (125) and Russia (72).  
While China has expanded its military outreach through the establishment of 
attaché offices abroad, the PLA’s overall presence or activity level outside of China’s 
borders are minuscule when compared to the extensive U.S. military presence throughout 
various Asian countries. The PLA is still too preoccupied with modernizing its forces, 
defending its borders, and preparing for a conflict with Taiwan to divert limited military  
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resources effectively toward sustaining large-scale diplomacy efforts. This lack of 
capabilities is what accounts for the overall diplomacy activity level differential between 
the U.S. military and the PLA. 
B. STRATEGIC PARTNERS 
When looking beyond the overall presence and activity levels, both the U.S. and 
Chinese militaries demonstrated distinctive levels of association with different Asian 
countries. This section analyzes the defining pillars of each military’s diplomacy efforts 
by examining interactions with strategic defense partners. Japan, South Korea, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were the countries that had the most defense-centric 
interactions with the United States. These high levels of interactions with the U.S. 
military suggest a strong willingness to interact with the United States. These countries 
will therefore be considered strategic partners of the United States. Pakistan, Russia, 
Burma and North Korea had high levels of defense-related interactions with China and 
will be considered China’s strategic partners. This section more closely examines the 
security relationships Washington and Beijing maintained with their respective strategic 
partners by evaluating each relationship against the background of political aims. The 
assumption is that because military relations are subordinate to political relations, 
examining the political climate surrounding current relationships can provide insights 
into future relationship prospects. This process reveals that aside from Thailand and 
Pakistan, which were more ambiguous in committing to either the United States or China, 
other Asian countries that are either U.S. or Chinese strategic partners are tied to either 
Washington or Beijing through various strategic interests or political objectives. 
Changing the context of these relationships would require substantial efforts. 
1. U.S.-Japan Security Relations 
Although the relationship has waxed and waned throughout the years, Japan has 
been a key ally of the U.S. military in Asia since the conclusion of World War II. In 
recent years, Japan’s concerns over Chinese military modernization have further 
solidified the U.S.-Japan security relationship. As a RAND report noted, Japanese 
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officials have become “increasingly willing to cite their concerns about Chinese military 
modernization publicly in official statements and planning documents.”65 These actions 
are prominent indicators of Japan’s intentions to embrace the United States more tightly 
as a part of its defense posture towards China.  
The Japanese defense focus appeared to have shifted toward China by the mid-
2000s. Since the end of the Cold War, Japanese officials have generally planned against 
North Korea, not China, as the primary threat.66 However, at the end of 2005, the leader 
of the Democratic Party of Japan, Maehara Seiji, suggested to an American audience that 
China is a “real threat.”67 Then Foreign Minister Aso Taro, echoed Maehara’s sentiments 
by reiterating that China’s large increases in defense spending are a “considerable 
threat.”68 Furthermore, the Japanese Defense Agency Director General Nukaga 
Fukushiro stated in January of 2006 that Japan’s security threats come from China in 
addition to North Korea.69 From a realist approach, the collective willingness of top 
Japanese defense officials to openly discuss China as a potential threat suggests that 
Japan would be more willing to embrace a closer relationship with the U.S. versus the 
Chinese military.  
Maintaining a close relationship with the U.S. military is consistent with the 
interests of Tokyo. From the perspective of the RAND Report “Pacific Currents: The 
responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia to China’s Rise,” close 
cooperation between U.S. and Japanese military forces is key to a healthy U.S.–Japanese 
alliance. According to the report, Japan’s security relationship with the United States is 
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probably one of the most important variables shaping Tokyo’s security posture because a 
robust military relationship “will work to improve Japanese capabilities (particularly the 
human elements) more quickly and effectively than would otherwise be possible and, at 
the same time, will minimize pressures for the development of the military capabilities 
(especially nuclear capabilities) that would most alarm neighbors.”70 
In addition to the U.S.—centric issues influencing the U.S.-Japan security 
relationship, there are also some China-centric issues that come into play. In recent years, 
Beijing’s opposition to Japanese officials’ visit to the Yasukuni shrine has been a big 
issue of contention. The way prominent Japanese leaders have approached the issue has 
had obvious influences on the climate of overall Sino-Japanese relations, which offers a 
commensurate gauge of the military-to-military relations. Moreover, the territorial 
dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, while unlikely to lead to an all out conflict, 
remains a point of friction for the Sino-Japanese relationship. While the Yasukuni and 
Senkaku/Diaoyu issues have largely been points of contention, regional developments on 
the Korean peninsula have most recently offered Beijing and Tokyo a chance for 
cooperation. Tokyo and Beijing have collectively emphasized the common interests of 
denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.71 
Taken altogether, the contrast in Japan’s levels of military-to-military interaction 
with the U.S. military and PLA appear to be consistent with Tokyo’s overall political 
interests. As long as what frames these interests remains in place, the likelihood for 
drastic shifts of military-to-military interaction will be diminutive. For now, the robust 
relationship the U.S. military has with Japanese counterparts does not appear to be 
susceptible to challenge by the JSDF’s interactions with the PLA. 
2. U.S.-Korea Security Relations 
Similar to Japan, South Korea has been a stable ally of the United States in recent 
decades. For a significant portion of these decades, South Korea’s security concerns 
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evolved around potential conflict with its immediate neighbor, North Korea. However, in 
the last two decades, international events such as the end of the Cold War and the 
collapse of the North Korean economy have caused shifts in South Korean long-range 
defense planning.72 New planning efforts show evidence of shifting toward broader 
concerns—notably, rapidly advancing military technologies and developing more self-
reliant defense capabilities for the period after Korea’s unification, commensurate with 
that of a regional power.73 In the effort to realize these goals, South Korea sees its 
relations with the United States as a necessity and hence continues to offer strong support 
for a close security relationship with the United States. 
South Korea’s desire to upgrade military technologies rapidly has been markedly 
apparent. Starting in the mid-1990s, the defense leadership has placed a high priority on 
procuring advanced command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 
systems; early warning and long-range strike capabilities; a blue-water navy; and naval 
air-defense capabilities.74 According to documents accidentally posted on the website of 
South Korea’s weapon procurement office, South Korea’s strategic weapon plans for the 
middle term (15 years) include developing nuclear-powered submarines, long-range 
fighters, and unmanned aerial surveillance vehicles.75 Analysts from RAND estimate that 
these plans are intended “less to counter anticipated North Korean aggression than to 
develop an elite force capable of waging high-tech warfare more broadly in the twenty –
first century.”76 
In addition to hardware upgrades, South Korea’s defense leadership also plans to 
revamp its forces. The recent Ministry of National Defense (MND) military 
transformation plan, Defense Reform 2020, calls for dramatic force structure changes by 
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the year 2020. These changes include reducing the number of army divisions from forty-
seven to twenty and cutting military personnel back from 681,000 to 500,000, which aim 
to “improve the forces’ qualitative capabilities while reducing their size and the number 
of weapon systems.”77 This leaning of military forces appears to be focused on keeping 
up with global military transformation trends beyond simply preparing to fight North 
Korea’s massive army or any other specific potential adversary.78 South Korea’s true 
military intentions, in the view of many knowledgeable observers both inside and outside 
of the country, are to develop military capabilities in order to be taken seriously as a 
regional actor.79 
In the interest of pursuing modernization while receiving steadfast security 
assurances, Seoul is likely to continue to engage the U.S. military as its security ally. The 
South Korean military is currently unprepared to undertake independently its security 
needs. This was evident from the political leadership’s language. South Korea leaders 
employed the term “cooperative self-reliant national defense” to describe its defense 
policy. A South Korean scholar succinctly defined this term to mean “cooperation with 
the United States, not cooperative security with its neighbors.”80  
Although China has some direct influence on South Korea’s defense policy via 
military-to-military interaction, the defense relationship between the two countries 
remains predominantly superficial. South Korea and China have thus far embarked on 
three types of military-to-military interactions: 
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• High-level exchanges;  
• Periodic working-level and information exchanges; and 
• Exchanges of military research institute students, athletes, and other 
personnel.81 
South Korea used these kinds of activities to both “educate the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) about South Korean perceptions on important issues and to address practical 
problems between the two militaries.”82  
The current bilateral military relations between South Korea and China might best 
be described as “both thin and one sided.”83 Activities remain very formal at the high-
level exchanges and the two militaries sometimes lack full cooperation.84 Military-to-
military relations do not include signs of mature bilateral military relationships such as 
significant arms sales or joint military exercises. Present military interactions appear to 
only take place for the sake of “improving the general atmosphere in South Korean–
Chinese political relations [rather] than on addressing concrete security problems and 
improving prospects for peace.”85 
Evaluating the context surrounding South Korea’s security relationship with both 
the United States and China offers a good explanation for the healthier levels of military-
to-military interactions between South Korean and U.S. forces. Even though South 
Korea’s security relationship with the PRC is improving, its military interactions with the 
PLA still fall short of robust levels. Insofar as future prospects are concerned, South 
Korea’s security objectives suggest that it will continue to embrace the U.S. military as a 
close security ally while keeping the PLA in the periphery. 
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3. U.S.–Philippine Security Relations 
The United States is presently the key defense ally for the Philippines. The U.S.-
Philippine security relationship dramatically cooled when U.S. basing agreements were 
terminated in 1992 and U.S. forces withdrew from the Philippines. However, the 1995 
Mischief Reef incident between the Philippines and China prompted Manila to rebuild 
defense ties with the United States. After the rapprochement, the Republic of the 
Philippines relied on the U.S. military to provide stability in the South China Sea. The 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 acted as a catalyst to congeal the security 
relationship further by enhancing military-to-military relations under the umbrella of 
counterterrorism cooperation. Manila’s primary focus in the short-term (through 2010) is 
to fight internal threats vis-à-vis anti-terrorism cooperation with the U.S. military. 
Looking beyond 2010, the Filipino leadership aims to solicit U.S. aid in rebuilding its 
maritime and air forces.86 While Sino-Philippine security relations have improved in 
recent years, Manila’s current security concerns and future security objectives are likely 
to continue fostering strong military-to-military ties with the United States.  
The rapprochement between the United States and the Philippines offered the 
respective military of each country opportunities to shore up relations with its 
counterpart. For instance, the 1998 U.S.–Philippine Visiting Forces Agreement permitted 
the resumption of U.S.–Philippine combined military exercises, and the 2002 Mutual 
Logistics Support Agreement provided the structure for reciprocal logistic support.87 
Once a close-knit U.S.-Philippine security relationship was reestablished, Manila turned 
its security focus inward, towards threats within its borders.88 
Manila identifies domestic terrorist/criminal groups as its main security threat. 
Groups such as the Communist Party of the Philippines New People’s Army, the Abu 
Sayyaf Group, the Misurai Breakaway Group, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, all 
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cause security concerns for Manila.89 These concerns were the motivation for the 
government’s decision to cooperate with the U.S. military in counterterrorism measures 
after 2001. Manila facilitated U.S. overflights and transients in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In return, the U.S. Military provided antiterrorism 
training and logistical/tactical support for the Philippine army as a part of 
counterterrorism operations on Mindanao, eventually named Operation Enduring 
Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P).90 
Since the launching of OEF-P, U.S. security assistance to the Philippines has 
dramatically increased. Assistance levels have not reached such heights since the 
withdrawal of the U.S. bases in 1992. Foreign military financing went from $2 million in 
fiscal year 2002 to a sustained level of $19.0 million or more in subsequent years.91 In 
addition, the Filipino army also received significant transfers of defense articles from the 
United States. Given the opportunity, Manila would like to receive even greater security 
assistance. 
Beyond 2010, the Republic of the Philippines would like to seek U.S. assistance 
to rebuild Philippine air and naval capabilities. In concentrating on its internal threats, 
Manila made a strategic decision to neglect its maritime and air capabilities in order to 
pool resources for its army.92 Assuming this strategy will prove effective and there will 
be a reduction of internal threat, the Philippine armed forces plans to reestablish a 
capability to defend against external threats.93 When such a time arrives, Manila will  
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most likely look to Washington instead of China for assistance since “despite official 
assertions that there are no external threats—China remains a factor in Philippine 
strategic thinking and defense planning.”94  
Until the Philippine armed forces develop a military capability to confront the 
PLA independently during incidents similar to Mischief Reef, diplomacy will remain the 
tool of choice for conducting military engagements. With this in mind, the prospects for 
enhanced military relations between China and the Philippines have been improving in 
recent years. Military engagements have included exchanges between senior and 
working-level officials, annual meetings at the minister of defense level, ship visits, and 
the PRC even provided a small amount of military assistance to the Philippines.95 The 
climate especially improved after the Hu-Arroyo summit in September 2004 where the 
leaders agreed to initiate regular high-level talks on defense cooperation, increase 
military exchange visits, and swap intelligence on transnational threats.96 
Despite the improved relations between the Philippine armed forces and the PLA, 
the U.S. military should not have significant concerns about the erosion of U.S.-
Philippine military relations. Improving military-to-military relations with China may 
have helped the Philippine government avert conflict with the PLA for the time being, 
but does not offer any long-term security guarantees or enables the large-scale military 
modernization required to develop an effective Philippine military. The Philippine armed 
forces require aid with internal security threats in the short-term and military 
modernization in the long-term. An intimate relationship with the U.S. military presents 
the best opportunities for realizing such goals. Therefore, Manila is compelled to 
continue endorsing a robust military-to-military relationship with the United States.  
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4. U.S.-Singapore Security Relations 
Singapore’s security relationship with the United States displays all the signs of 
mature military-to-military relations. Arms transfers, training, basing, and exchanges at 
different levels are all elements of military-to-military relations between the two 
countries. For Singapore, these elements serve as reinforcements for the expectation that 
the United States will remain engaged in the region in order to perpetuate stability. 
Barring any catastrophic circumstances capable of throwing the current status quo into 
disarray, the healthy military relationship between the two countries should endure in the 
foreseeable future.  
The United States has a big role in facilitating Singapore’s weapons 
modernization process. This modernization process includes both procurement and 
training. For instance, Singapore purchased the AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-
to-Air Missiles from the United States and also received the training and software to arm 
its F-16 aircraft with the missiles.97 This instance also demonstrates a substantial level of 
trust as the missiles themselves were kept in the United States in order to adhere to the 
U.S. policy of not being the first to “introduce sophisticated military technology into the 
region.”98 Another advance weapons system Singapore acquired from the United States 
is the AH-64D Apache attack helicopters with the Longbow system. The Apache “rapidly 
and automatically searches, detects, locates, classifies, and prioritizes multiple moving 
and stationary land, sea, and air targets in clear and adverse weather conditions.”99 
Similar to the AIM-120 missiles, the Apaches are also kept in the United States, where 
the Singaporean crews train on the system with the Arizona National Guard.100 
In addition to being linked by the transferring of and training on advanced 
weapons systems, the Singaporean and U.S. defense relationship is also connected 
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through basing arrangements. Singapore is home to the U.S. Navy Logistic Group West 
Pacific and the U.S. Air Force 497th Combat Training Squadron. Moreover, the Changi 
Naval Base can accommodate a U.S. aircraft carrier, and consistently receives port visits 
from U.S. ships.101 
Singapore embraces the above-described security ties with the U.S. military in 
order to maintain stability in the region. This stability exists on two levels. On the first 
level, Singapore is concerned with what defense analyst Tim Huxley calls the “grand 
regional level.”102 According to a RAND study, “Singapore relies on extra-regional 
powers—primarily the United States—to maintain the balance of power and prevent a 
larger power from dominating the smaller Asian states.”103 The next level is Singapore’s 
concern with its immediate vicinity. On this level, Singapore relies mostly on the defense 
capacity generated by its own resources to protect against potential aggression or regional 
domination by its neighbors, primarily Malaysia or Indonesia.104 The assistance of the 
U.S. military is indispensible on both levels. 
While an assured security relationship with United States carries the 
preponderance of focus in Singapore’s defense plan, the plan also seeks to improve 
military relations with China. From Singapore’s perspective, “military engagement with 
China is part and parcel of its approach of enmeshing China—and its military—into a 
web of regional relationships that fosters the emergence of a China that does not act 
coercively or otherwise upset regional stability.”105 Singapore’s defense relations with 
China have indeed improved in recent years. During Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean’s 
visit to China in November 2005, the two sides agreed to improve defense ties by 
establishing annual defense policy dialogues at the Ministry of Defense Permanent 
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Secretary level and stepping up high-level military visits and port calls. In addition, the 
two governments also agreed to cooperate in non-traditional security issues such as 
international humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations.106 
Minister Teo also extended scholarship offers for PLA officers to attend graduate degree 
studies in Singapore.107  
The improved defense relations between Singapore and China, while significant, 
should not threaten U.S.-Singapore defense relations. As previously noted, Singapore 
relies heavily on U.S. support on both levels of its defense plan. The lack of a domestic 
outcry against a robust defense relationship with the United States further bolsters the 
current arrangement. According to a RAND interview with Evelyn Goh,  
Singapore is probably the only country in ASEAN that can have as close a 
military relationship with the United States as it does without domestic 
political problems. While China may be displeased with the high level of 
Singaporean defense cooperation with the United States, the Chinese have 
relatively few levers to use on Singapore in this regard.108  
Consequently, Singapore has and will most likely continue to covet U.S. military 
assistance and presence in East Asia.  
5. U.S.-Thai Security Relations 
Thailand has an active security relationship with the United States and has long 
collaborated with the United States on security matters. Thailand supported U.S. military 
efforts in the Korean, Vietnam, Persian Gulf, OEF and OIF conflicts. For these 
contributions, the United States has reciprocated by affording Thailand opportunities to 
acquire U.S. military hardware and training. The U.S. and Thai militaries appear to 
maintain a close relationship through active collaboration. Despite this appearance  
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however, the Thai military also maintains affable relations with the PLA. Although not as 
involved as the one with the U.S. military, this relationship is still extensive enough to 
warrant attention. 
Recent examples of Thai support for U.S. military operations are abundant. The 
Thai government authorized the U.S. military to use the U-Tapao naval airbase and 
Sattahib naval base for logistical support during the launch of Operation Enduring 
Freedom. After the fall of Kabul, Bangkok dispatched 130 engineers, medics, and Special 
Forces troops to Afghanistan to aid reconstruction. Thailand also sent 450 engineers and 
medics to Iraq to help with road building and medical care.109 Thai forces have also 
cooperated closely in the Asian component of the global war on terrorism. A notable 
example of such support was the arrest of Jamaah Islamiah leader (an al Qaeda affiliate), 
Hambali, and the capture of several other top leaders who were suspected of plotting 
attacks against U.S. interests.110 
The U.S.-Thai military relationship is even strong enough to endure turbulent 
times. During the period of temporary suspension of military cooperation after the 2006 
coup, U.S. and Thai forces worked to maintain the preexisting channels of 
communication and uphold vital links in the traditionally cooperative relationship. For 
example, both sides worked to ensure that events such as the annual Cobra Gold 
exercises still took place. Military relations quickly returned to normal in 2008 after the 
newly elected government took office.111 
In response to Bangkok’s support in security issues, the United States has for 
years afforded Thailand much defense related support. In October 2003, the United States 
declared Thailand a major non-NATO U.S. ally, which enabled Bangkok to purchase 
new types of U.S. military hardware along with improved access to credit guarantees.112 
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In addition to arms transfers, examples of support include offering military training to 
Thai forces in the United States and conducting numerous joint training exercises each 
year. The Cobra Gold exercise, held annually in Thailand, is actually the biggest U.S. 
annual joint exercise in Asia.113 The collective experiences gained through defense 
collaboration have greatly helped solidify U.S.-Thai military relations.  
Parallel to Bangkok’s effort to nurture military relations with the United States, 
the Thai leadership has also been actively engaging the PRC on defense related issues. 
Although not as long as the relationship with the U.S. military, Thailand’s military 
relationship with China has been well-established and dates back to 1979, when the two 
cooperated against Soviet-backed Vietnamese forces.114 Most of this cooperation came 
via arms transfers, which even today is still the primary venue for military diplomacy 
between the PRC and Thailand. Weapons have ranged from tanks to artillery and naval 
warships.115 In 2002, Bangkok ordered two 1,400-ton (fully loaded) offshore patrol 
vessels that have since been delivered.116 China has also finished field-testing a tank 
specifically for the Thai market. Finally, the two nations agreed on the sale of ninety-
seven armored personnel carriers in 2005.117 
Further improving Sino-Thai military relations beyond arms trade encounters, 
Senior Thai and Chinese military officials have long enjoyed frequent contacts. Thailand 
and China initiated annual ministerial level defense security consultations in 2002.118 The 
Thai Navy and the PLA Navy held their first joint exercise in December 2005. And China 
proposed a joint maritime regional exercise with Thailand and other states during an 
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ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in 2005.119 Army Commander-in-Chief Sonthi 
Boonvaratglin visited Beijing in 2006 and received a $49 million package of military aid 
and training.120 Thailand dispatched thirty Special Forces soldiers, including a lieutenant 
general, to Guangzhou in July 2007, for two-week combined exercises.121 
Unlike other U.S. strategic partners, Thailand’s defense policy does not display 
definitive signs of allegiance to the United States. Bangkok appears to maintain strong 
military relations with the United States and China alike. This can perhaps be attributed 
to the belief among Thai elites that “the nation’s position and history provide a powerful 
guide, one that finds security in omnidirectional diplomacy and, in particular, remaining 
on good terms with major powers.”122 Bearing this in mind, the U.S. military must 
consistently stay engaged with the Thai armed forces through active relations. Even 
minor set backs such as slowing relations during periods of regime instability (military 
coups) may afford the PLA an edge in what can potentially materialize into a vigorous 
competition for the esteem of the Thai armed forces. 
6. China’s Strategic Partners 
Just as the U.S. displayed tendencies to nurture defense relations with certain 
strategic partners, China had its favorites as well. Pakistan and Russia consistently ranked 
as China’s top two partners in maintaining defense-focused ties. In addition to these two 
countries, China also had significantly higher levels of defense interaction with Burma 
and North Korea than the United States. This section assesses the context of Beijing’s 
security relationships with these four countries and suggests that besides Pakistan, the 
U.S. military has noticeably less influence over these countries through military 
diplomacy activities. 
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7. China-Pakistan Security Relations 
China has long maintained close defense ties to Pakistan. Historically, China has 
used its relationship with Pakistan to keep India, its main rival in South Asia, tied 
down.123 Dr. Swaran Singh, an Associate Professor at the School of International Studies, 
Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and Academic Consultant at Center de 
Sciences Humaines, also in New Delhi, refers to the China-Pakistan relationship as an 
“all-weather, time-tested, long-standing special relationship.”124 
In addition to routine high-level visits, China has maintained this special 
relationship through a multi-faceted approach, which included supplying conventional 
weapons, providing defense technologies and conducting joint military exercises. 
Supplying weapons to Pakistan remains a staple of Beijing’s defense relationship with 
Pakistan. China is consistently Pakistan’s most reliable supplier of weapons. As reported 
by the SIPRI Yearbook 2005, Pakistan ordered four Jiangwei-class Frigates, 4 Z-9C ASW 
helicopters, two Type-347G Fire Control Radars and sixteen C-802 Anti-ship missiles 
from China between 2002 and 2005 alone.125 In addition to the transfer of weapons, it 
has been highly speculated that China might be passing “nuclear and missile technologies 
and know-how to and from Pakistan.”126 Finally, of the eleven joint exercises the PLA 
conducted from 2001 to 2006, four were bilateral exercises with Pakistan. 
Although Pakistan has long had a “special relationship” with China, the GWOT 
refocused military relations with the United States dramatically. Under President George 
W. Bush’s administration, Pakistan became one of the leading recipients of U.S. aid. This 
includes having received about $2.2 billion in security-related aid since 2001. Moreover, 
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Pakistan has also received some $6 billion in military reimbursements for supporting 
U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts.127 Additionally, in 2006, the United States signed arms 
transfer agreements with Pakistan in excess of $3.5 billion, which ranked Pakistan first 
among all arms clients in that year.128 According to the Bush administration, these sales 
were a part of the effort to shore up relations with a “vital ally of the United States” in 
fighting the GWOT. U.S. military and intelligence officials have also deliberately 
applauded military-to-military relations with Pakistan. In November 2007, Lt. Gen. 
Carter Ham called Pakistan “a great partner so far in the war on terror” and lauded 
collaboration and cooperation in border missions.129 In another instance, Adm. Mike 
Mullen, chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, reiterated Washington's commitment to 
Pakistan during a visit to Islamabad in June 2008. In his words, “Pakistan and the United 
States remain steadfast allies, and Pakistan’s military is fighting bravely against 
terrorism.”130 
The defense relationships between China, Pakistan and the United States may be 
evolving. Traditionally, Pakistan has been a strategic ally of the PRC and the United 
States has had close defense ties with India. However, under the influence of the GWOT, 
the United States has made new efforts to improve relations with Pakistan via enhanced 
defense relations. This improvement can become a potential lever to challenge the status 
quo defined by the last few decades. 
8. China-Russia Security Relations 
The security relationship between Beijing and Moscow has experienced 
drastically different climates since the founding of the PRC. The spectrum of this 
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relationship has varied from being comrades in arms to bitter enemies. Today, the 
defense relationship between China and Russia appears to be waxing. This trend appears 
to have been driven by the West’s arms embargo against China, Russia’s dire economic 
situation after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Russia’s unfavorable views of the 
United States. 
While Russian weapon transfers to China may be slowing, the amount of arms 
transferred has been high in recent years. With the Western arms sales to China embargo 
in place since 1989, Russia has been China’s primary supply of modern weapons. 
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s 2008 handbook, 
Russia was responsible for making 25 percent of the world’s conventional weapons 
transfers from 2003 to 2007. Of these transfers, 45 percent were exclusively to China.131 
Since neither Russia nor China discloses comprehensive figures on weapons shipments, 
the exact dollar amount of transfers remain elusive. However, according to some 
estimates based announced deals, press reports and private monitoring of arms transfers, 
deliveries to China from 1992 to 2006 totaled $26 billion.132  
The defense relationship between Russia and China has been mutually beneficial 
for the two countries. China has received much-needed technology and weapons to help 
modernize the PLA. Russia has received a generous income to help sustain its sizeable 
defense industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union. While some experts cite Russia’s 
concerns for an emerging China threat as the PLA continues to gain strength and question 
the future of the defense relationship between the two countries, there is certainly still 
reason for the relationship to continue. 
Although a stronger China may become potential threat to Russia’s own security, 
Moscow may also see a stronger China as a means of challenging U.S. military 
dominance. During a speech at the 2007 Munich Conference on Security Policy, 
Vladimir Putin strongly condemned U.S. military force. In his words, 
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Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force—
military force—in international relations, force that is plunging the world 
into an abyss of permanent conflicts…We are seeing a greater and greater 
disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal 
norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s 
legal system. One state, and, of course, first and foremost the United 
States, has overstepped its national bounds in every way.133  
From this perspective, Russia may accept some potential risks associated with 
modernizing the PLA and continue to maintain a tight defense relationship with China in 
the future because it sees the U.S. military global dominance as a bigger threat. 
While the political climate may constrain military-to-military relations between 
the United States and Russia, there is certainly room for improvement in the level of 
interactions between the two militaries. From 2005 to 2007, the level of U.S.-Russian 
military interaction was roughly on par with the U.S. military’s interactions with 
Nepal.134 Given the size and geopolitical importance differential between Russia and 
Nepal, there is obvious disparity in the level of effort the U.S. military exerted in 
engaging Russian counterparts. Consequently, from the military-to-military relations 
perspective, the PLA possessed an edge over the U.S. military in conducting diplomacy 
with Russia. 
9. China-Burma Security Relations 
Burma presents a unique situation for military diplomacy. The Burmese military 
established rule through a military junta in 1988. This government became known as the 
State Peace and Development Council or SPDC. The SPDC has since been affiliated with 
problems such as human rights abuses and corruption, which instigated extensive U.S. 
sanctions against the SPDC. U.S. interaction with Burma has, in recent years, been 
virtually non-existent and the probability for developing military relations with the ruling 
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junta seems unlikely if not impossible in the foreseeable future. In contrast to U.S. 
actions, the PRC continues to be one of Burma’s main supporters. The two countries 
maintain a close mutually beneficial relationship, with defense ties as an important pillar 
of the relationship. The situation framed by the lack of U.S. contacts and China’s active 
relations with Burma implies that even though Washington has no direct contact with 
Burma, there could be potential to exert influence on the SPDC through a collaborative 
relationship with Beijing. 
The SPDC’s corruption problems inhibit U.S. abilities to maintain security 
relations with Burma. According to Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption 
Perceptions Index, Burma was tied with Somalia as the most corrupt country in the 
world. This is a further deterioration from its 2006 position as the second-most corrupt 
country in the world.135 Corruption in Burma is so pervasive that even the Burmese 
armed forces, or Tatmadaw, are suspected of being directly involved in opium poppy 
cultivation, trafficking and distribution.136 Washington has intentionally isolated the 
SPDC because it does not want to convey an approving or legitimizing gesture 
unintentionally toward the SPDC. 
The PRC has not embraced comparable standards of conduct in dealing with 
Burma. As affirmed by Michael Green and Derek Mitchell in “Asia's Forgotten Crisis: A 
New Approach to Burma,” Beijing's interactions with Burma have been essential to the 
SPDC’s survival.137 In addition to economic aid, China has provided Burma with an 
estimated $2 to $3 billion in military aid since the early 1990s, which has enabled the 
Burmese army to expand from 180,000 to 450,000 in 2005. China was also active in 
shipping weapons to Burma in 2006, coinciding with the Burmese army’s offensive 
against the Karens.138 The actions of Beijing has provided the SPDC with both “moral 
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and financial support—including funds and materiel to pay off Burmese military elites —
thus increasing its leverage at home and abroad.”139 Furthermore, the authors argue that 
“By throwing China's weight behind the SPDC, Beijing has complicated the strategic 
calculations of those of Burma's neighbors that are concerned about the direction the 
country is moving in, thus enabling the junta to pursue a classic divide-and-conquer 
approach.”140  
In exchange for supporting the SPDC and taking the position that political and 
human rights conditions in Burma are its “internal affairs,” China receives important 
military benefits in return. For example, China has access to ports and listening posts in 
Burma, which allow the PLA to monitor naval and other military activities around the 
Indian Ocean and the Andaman Sea. Moreover, Beijing receives preferential deals for 
access to Burma's oil and gas reserves to feed its insatiable appetite for energy.141 
As China continues to provide support for the SPDC, the current Burmese regime 
is unlikely to alter its course. The Sino-Burmese relationship simply offers too many 
benefits for the two parties involved to deviate from the present status quo. As this 
relationship continues, the United States, if it remains on the course of its current 
policies, will continue to forfeit the ability to directly shape Burma.  
10. China-North Korea Security Relations 
North Korea is perhaps the most difficult partner with which China maintains 
security relations. As Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Stanford's 
Asia-Pacific Research Center points out, “Everyone who deals with North Korea 
recognizes them as a very unstable actor.”142 Even in the face of such difficulties, China 
remains North Korea’s closest ally. For Beijing, maintaining active security ties with 
Pyongyang enhances the state-to-state relationship, which serves China’s national 
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objectives. Currently, the biggest threat to China’s defense ties to North Korea stem from 
Pyongyang’s actions (e.g., the unannounced 2006 missile tests). Washington has virtually 
no defense relations with Pyongyang and therefore is not in a position to compete with 
Beijing over maintaining security ties with North Korea. 
Pyongyang is not a reliable ally for Beijing because Kim Jong-Il's foreign policy 
is, like its leader, highly unpredictable. In Sneider’s words, North Korea is “extremely 
difficult to deal with, even as an ally.” Furthermore, he says the relationship between 
Beijing and Pyongyang is by no means “a warm and fuzzy relationship.”143 For this 
reason, Daniel Pinkston, a Northeast Asia expert at the International Crisis Group, agrees 
that despite a long alliance, Beijing does not control Pyongyang. In Pinkston’s view, “In 
general, Americans tend to overestimate the influence China has over North Korea.” He 
argues that Kim still makes up his own mind: “At the end of the day, China has little 
influence over the military decisions.”144 Even so, “Beijing, arguably, continues to have 
more leverage over Pyongyang than any other nation and has played a central role in the 
ongoing Six-Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North 
Korea.”145 
Beijing nurtures its leverage on Pyongyang in the interest of supporting its own 
objectives. Maintaining a friendly North Korea has strategic value; such a relationship 
“ensures a friendly nation on its northeastern border, as well as providing a buffer zone 
between China and democratic South Korea, which is home to around 29,000 U.S. troops 
and marines.”146 According to Shen Dingli of the Institute of International Studies at 
Fudan University in Shanghai, this allows China to reduce its military deployment in its 
Northeast and “focus more directly on the issue of Taiwanese independence.”147  
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China’s recent efforts in maintaining security relations with North Korea through 
military diplomacy are evident. Since 2000, China has hosted four visits from Kim Jong 
Il and both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have visited Pyongyang.148 Moreover, in 
December 2008, Liang Guanglie, Chief of the PLA General Staff, met with Yon Kyong 
Chol, deputy director general of Military Foreign Affairs Division of the Ministry of 
People’s Armed Forces of DPRK.149 As China analyst Ken Allen notes, these increases 
in military relations between the two states “underscore the length and depth” of bilateral 
relations between China and North Korea.150 
In contrast to China’s security relationship with North Korea, the United States 
has had virtually no defense-centric contacts with North Korea. The only instances of 
direct engagements revolve around the recovery efforts of U.S. soldier remains from the 
Korean War and discussions of Pyongyang’s nuclear activities. Outside of direct 
interaction, U.S. leadership continues to condemn North Korea’s arms sales publicly to 
and technology cooperation with countries like Iran and Syria, as well as North Korean 
involvement in international terrorism.151 While Washington’s direct interactions with 
Pyongyang through the Six-Party Talks has potentially yielded significant results, 
indirect engagements have done little in altering the course of North Korean behavior. 
North Korea has been and mostly likely will continue to be a conundrum as a 
security partner. Of Pyongyang’s existing security ties, the PRC holds the strongest 
leverage and hence the most influence. U.S. defense ties to North Korea are weak at best 
and offer little chance in the immediate future of becoming a substantial conduit for 
influence from Washington.  
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11. Summary 
This section examined the political contexts surrounding each security 
relationship the U.S. and Chinese militaries maintained with their respective strategic 
partners. In each relationship, inherent interests connected the parties involved. A closer 
examination of these connections revealed that current relationships appear stable and 
hence unlikely to be altered easily. Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore 
will most likely remain strategic partners to the United States in the near term. Similarly, 
Russian, Burma and North Korea will, in all probability, continue the same theme of 
association with China. The future conduct of Thailand and Pakistan appear to be less 
predictable. The nature of these existing defense relationships suggest that some countries 
may be more easily persuaded then others in altering the current dominant features of 
Asia’s defense relationship landscape. 
C. PREFERRED TOOLS 
As Chapter I elaborated, the U.S. approach to conducting military diplomacy was 
fairly well balanced in that that tools from each of the four categories of engagement: 
strategic-level activities, regional activities, PME exchanges, and non-traditional security 
cooperation were all employed on a regular basis. The U.S. military especially 
emphasized high-level visits, PME exchanges, bi-lateral/multi-lateral conferences, and 
joint exercises and training events. China, on the other hand, demonstrated a more limited 
approach by predominantly enhancing security relationships through regional activities 
such as regional forums and through high-level official visits or exchanges. Even though 
China’s military diplomacy efforts appeared more limited overall, there were four 
specific areas where the PRC was on equal footing or even possessed an advantage over 
the United States. These areas were consultations and strategic dialogues; state-to-state 
military protocols; regional forum participation; and peacekeeping operations. 
The purpose of this section is to examine each of the four above-mentioned areas 
more closely by evaluating the U.S. military’s responses. The goal is to assess whether 
the PLA’s current equal footing or advantage in these areas will potentially challenge or 
adversely affect the future of U.S. military diplomacy efforts in Asia. This section will 
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offer that disregarding the possible differences in value of each activity type, the U.S. 
military’s overall diplomacy effort in Asia is likely to remain more successful than 
comparable efforts exerted by Chinese counterparts. 
1. Consultations and Strategic Dialogues 
Holding defense consultations and strategic dialogues with Asian countries is a 
military diplomacy venue that the PLA employed as effectively as the U.S. military. 
China took a very comprehensive approach in engaging other Asian countries through 
consultations. As the last chapter noted, even though the occurrences with each country 
remain low, China held defense consultations with Indonesia, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Russia and 
Vietnam within the period of 2003 to 2006.152 The U.S. military engaged almost all 
Asian countries through high numbers of bilateral/multi-lateral conferences. North Korea 
was the only country that the U.S. military did not actively participate in defense 
consultations or strategic dialogues with.153  
On the surface, the U.S. military’s high volume engagements across almost all 
Asian countries would seem to hold the advantage, but on closer consideration, the net 
impact achieved would rank the two militaries equally effective in this area. Even though 
the U.S. military had more interactions with more partners, the engagements occurred via 
conferences at working levels. The PLA, on the other hand, conducted fewer 
engagements, but kept most interactions on more strategic (i.e., Defense Ministerial or 
General Staff) levels.154 Assuming strategic level engagements hold more prospective 
impact for “Consultations and Strategic Dialogues,” the PLA balanced U.S. volume with 
strategic significance. 
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Assuming the PLA will maintain its current mode of operation in conducting 
consultations and strategic dialogues, the U.S. military would have to increase the impact 
of its interactions in order to gain the advantage in this military diplomacy venue. Since 
the volume of activities with almost all Asian countries is already high, the most 
prominent remedy would be to elevate the level on which engagements occur.  
2. State-to-State Military Protocols 
Conducting state-to-state military protocols is another venue where PLA efforts 
were comparable to that of the U.S. military’s. Each military had its strength but also its 
associated weakness. The combination of qualities resulted in similar effects. 
The PLA was more successful in engaging a higher number of Asian countries 
through state-to-state military protocols but fell short in consistency. Holding frequent 
military protocols with almost all Asian countries afforded the PLA opportunities to 
maintain military relations with all Asian countries except Bhutan and Taiwan. The 
shortcoming in the process was the lack of predictability in patterns of reoccurrence. 
China’s protocol pattern was more sporadic than repetitious.  
The U.S. military’s efforts in using the same diplomacy tool were also strong and 
demonstrated more consistency, but engaged fewer Asian countries than the PLA. The 
U.S. military did not engage Bhutan, Burma, Laos, North Korea, Russia, or Timor-Leste 
through holding state-to-state military protocols. The U.S. military was, however, more 
consistent in maintaining recurring visits with countries. Most visits occurred on a 
predictable yearly basis. With consistency already in place, expanding the number of 
Asian countries engaged would enhance the U.S. military’s ability, over the PLA, to 
nourish military relations through this tool. 
3. Regional Forums 
Beijing possessed a distinct advantage over Washington in reinforcing security 
relationships through regional forums. The United States, not being native to Asia, tends 
to have less of a legitimate stake in its regional forums. For the most part, China has a 
large stake in important Asian regional forums such as the SCO, and for good reason. As 
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stated in a RAND report dealing with U.S. interests in Central Asia, “China, the 
neighborhood’s other heavy hitter, is also anxious to enhance its relationships with the 
Central Asian republics; it is the lead nation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
(SCO) and has participated in multiple military exercises with various Central Asian 
countries.”155 Even though such an environment favors the PLA’s ability to exert 
influence through regional forums, there is not cause for immediate alarm. The U.S. 
military exerts influence in the same areas via other means. 
Chapter I discussed the various forums that the PRC is involved in. Of the 
numerous forums discussed, the SCO and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are the 
most defense-centric mediums the PLA directly operates within. These forums have 
served as mediums for the PLA to shore up relations with other militaries by allowing 
PLA participation in defense-related activities ranging from conferences to military 
exercises.  
With regard to the PLA’s participation in the SCO and ARF, combating terrorism 
has often been an underlying theme. Since 2001, fighting terrorism has become a 
mainstream military interest. Consequently, security cooperation on the issue has been on 
the rise as well. While China has used counterterrorism cooperation to maneuver the PLA 
into better position to conduct military diplomacy with SCO and ARF members, the 
United States has also used the same issue to build ties with members of these two 
forums. The U.S. military improved ties with the Central Asian SCO members through 
the effort to support OEF, and at the same time, reinforced relationships with ARF 
members such as the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia. 
Activities revolving around OEF deeply entrenched the U.S. military in Central 
Asia. As a RAND report succinctly states, “The onset of U.S. military operations against 
the Taliban regime and its al Qaeda allies dramatically heightened the nature and extent 
of U.S. military engagement with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.156 U.S.  
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engagement in the region not only included setting up military bases (Karshi-Khanabad, 
Uzbekistan, and Manas, Kyrgyzstan), but also provided generous military aid and 
training for various countries.157  
Washington reinforced the security relationship with Uzbekistan through various 
forms of military assistance. This assistance has included two armored cutters (for 
patrolling the Amu Darya River), radios, helicopter upgrades, language training, non-
commissioned officer (NCO) training support, a military modeling and simulation center, 
psychological operations training, airport navigation system upgrades, and, according to 
some reports, joint construction with the United States of Il-114 aircraft.158 Furthermore, 
the Uzbeks have benefited from participating in joint military exercises with the U.S. 
military, to include informal ones undertaken by U.S. troops and Uzbek Air Force 
personnel at the Khanabad air base.159  
Washington also presented Kyrgyzstan with assorted military aid. Kyrgyzstan 
received military equipment including communications equipment (estimated at over 
$1.4 million in value), night vision capability, and reportedly, helicopters. Moreover, 
Kyrgyzstan also received military medical assistance, Marshall Center slots, and NCO 
training.160 In addition, Military-to-military contacts, including high-level visits, were 
also increased. Even the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, visited in 
November 2002.161 Joint exercises and training involving Special Forces, peacekeepers, 
and rapid reaction troops also increased. The U.S. military even promised to help with 
military reform.162 Furthermore, relations received another boost at the end of 2005 when 
the U.S. military shifted most of its OEF support air operations from Karshi-Khanabad to  
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Manas. In June of 2008, the outgoing U.S. commander at Manas reportedly revealed that 
the United States paid $17.5 million to lease the land for U.S. facilities and $21 million 
for airport fees each year.163 
In addition to receiving direct U.S. military aid, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have 
also benefited from the U.S.-led military presence within its borders. U.S. (and other 
coalition) forces have paid for extensive infrastructure upgrades in both Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. The upgrades ranged from the construction of new housing and other 
structures to improving runways. There are other monetary benefits as well. For example, 
Kyrgyzstan received payment for each aircraft takeoff and landing at Manas Airfield.164  
Even though Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are the two Central Asian countries that 
received the most substantial amount of military aid, Tajikistan also received 
considerable assistance to its military. Beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2002, the United 
States started assisting the Tajikistan military through FMF and IMET funds. These funds 
helped reform the Tajik military and improved its capabilities in conducting 
counterinsurgency and counternarcotics operations. In addition, the funds helped to 
facilitate better interoperability with other forces, including those of the United States, by 
providing medical equipment, demining equipment, night vision devices, English 
language training, and exposure of military and civilian officials to Western-style 
democracy, civil-military relations, and human rights policies.165 
The United States also improved relations with Turkmenistan through military 
relations as well, albeit on a very limited level. The Turkmen displayed willingness to 
cooperate on humanitarian efforts by allowing U.S. refueling operations to be based 
within its borders but did not show interest in accepting aid.166 An agreement was  
 
 
                                                 
163 Jim Nichol, Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests (Washington 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 29. 
164 RAND Corporation, “Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia,” 2005, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG338.pdf (accessed December 11, 2008), 13. 
165 RAND Corporation, “Defining U.S. Interests in Central Asia,” 14-15. 
166 Ibid., 29. 
 65
reached with the Turkmen government that refueling missions were allowed as long as 
they were humanitarian and not combat in nature.167 In this respect, although limited, 
cooperation has improved under the premise of NTSC. 
In conjunction with U.S. efforts to build better military relations with the SCO 
members, the U.S. armed forces also improved ties with select ARF members. As 
discussed earlier, three ARF members, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, were 
among the top five of the U.S. military’s most active engagement partners. In addition, 
the United States maintains robust relationships with all other members, with the 
exception of Burma. 
So while China’s ties through regional forums have given the PLA new 
opportunities to enhance military ties with select Asian countries, the underpinning issues 
that sustain these military relationships also supported U.S. military interaction with 
many of the same countries. From this perspective, the advantage that the PLA possessed 
through China’s close relations with Asia’s regional forums have had no significant 
effects on U.S. military relations with countries who have memberships in the same 
regional forums. The U.S. military simply needs to continue the current course and 
capitalize on existing opportunities. 
4. Peacekeeping 
Beijing vigorously advertises the involvement of its forces in peacekeeping 
operations. The 2004 and 2006 defense White Papers publicized China’s peacekeeping 
involvement in Asia by drawing attention to the 899 troops dispatched to Cambodia and 
Timor-Leste. The U.S. military was not involved in any peacekeeping activities in Asia 
during the same period. Hence, China may have an edge in this facet of military 
diplomacy. In spite of this, there are two things to consider. First, the compositions of 
Chinese forces involved were not always military. Second, outside of peacekeeping, 
China’s participation in the full spectrum of NTSC activities was limited.  
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In accomplishing peacekeeping missions, Beijing often dispatches forces 
composed of non-military members. These members often include medical personnel, 
engineers or police. The makeup of these forces draws questions about making 
appropriate “military diplomacy” comparisons. The United States may very well have 
humanitarian aid works in the same countries that are not accounted for in the same way. 
The next point is that peacekeeping is only one of the three activities falling under 
the umbrella of non-traditional security cooperation. The other two activities are counter-
terrorism and humanitarian assistance. From this perspective, the U.S. military is still 
distinctively more capable of building military relations through comprehensive NTSC 
activities. China’s comparatively small volume of counterterrorism activities indicates 
that the PLA’s capabilities in this realm are still limited. Furthermore, the PLA’s 
humanitarian assistance capabilities remain somewhat inept, as was demonstrated by its 
inefficient execution of relief efforts after the recent Sichuan earthquake. As noted in a 
Joint Forces Quarterly article, the shortcomings were caused by poorly integrated 
command structure, aging equipment, and personnel not trained to deal with large scale 
humanitarian and disaster relief contingencies.168  
5. Summary 
The purpose of this “Preferred Tools” section was to examine more closely each 
of the four tools the PLA employed as well or better than the U.S. military in conducting 
diplomacy. After evaluating PLA actions in the four categories discussed earlier against 
the backdrop of corresponding U.S. activities in other venues of military diplomacy, there 
appears to be no immediate challenge or threat to the U.S. ability to consolidate 
relationships through defense-centric activities in Asia. From that perspective, the U.S. 
armed forces remain dominant over the PLA in conducting diplomacy in the region. 
Despite the current success, however, there are available measures to enhance 
U.S. military diplomacy effectiveness further. In conducting consultations and strategic 
dialogues, the U.S. military can yield more impact by elevating the level at which 
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interactions take place. In the realm of state-to-state military protocols, there is room to 
expand the list of engagement partners. Additionally, although U.S. military diplomacy is 
not directly threatened by the PLA’s participation in regional forums and peacekeeping 
operations in Asia, increased U.S. military participation in these capacities could further 
enhance the United States’ overall military diplomacy effort. 
D. THE CAVEAT TO MEASURING SUCCESS 
Some important considerations must be made in declaring the U.S. military 
victorious over the PLA in conducting diplomacy. The research effort of this project did 
not assign any weighted values to the different activity types of military diplomacy: 
possible differentials in the amount of impact different activities may posses were 
neglected. 
The effect of impact is obviously very important to measure whose military 
diplomacy effort in Asia is making the bigger difference in solidifying security 
relationships. Obtaining the answer to this question would, however, be extremely 
challenging. The process would have to involve listing all venues of military diplomacy 
with each country and then assigning weighted values to each venue for the degree of 
importance (based on either perception, results, or some combination of both). All venues 
multiplied by the predetermined weighted value would then yield a value reflecting the 
impact of that particular venue. Finally, the impacts of each venue would be summarized 
to gain a total value reflecting the effectiveness of military diplomacy for that specific 
country. The equation below demonstrates this point: 
Ax + By + Cz = Net worth of military diplomacy effort with country X 
In the above equation, A, B and C would be venues of military diplomacy such as the 
number of high-level visits, FMS, and joint exercises. These venues would be multiplied 
by x, y, and z, which are predetermined weighted values that most accurately reflect how 
country X prioritizes the importance of different types of military engagements. For 
example, if country Burma sees high-level visits as affirmation for the legitimacy of its 
regime, a higher weighted value would be placed on venue A.  
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This process would mostly likely become difficult and complex. First, the 
research project would have to accurately estimate the level of importance each country 
associates with different military diplomacy venues. Second, all military-to-military 
interactions have to be accounted for accurately. Next, a military diplomacy impact value 
would have to be figured for each Asian country. Finally, the values for all Asian 
countries have to be summarized to arrive at a value reflecting total military diplomacy 
efforts in Asia.  
The complexity and scope of such an undertaking would are beyond the grasp and 
capabilities of this project. Consequently, this author did not attempt to attach weighted 
values to any military diplomacy activities. This project only compared how the United 
States and China each conducted military diplomacy with all countries in Asia. The 
comparison found U.S. efforts to be effective. However, these results could change if 
weighted values were implemented to the comparative process. 
E. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyze these three observations, provide 
potential explanations, and assess future impacts to U.S. military diplomacy efforts in 
Asia. The first section suggested that the overall military diplomacy activity level 
disparity between the U.S. and Chinese militaries is attributed to disproportions in 
military capabilities between the two forces. While the PLA is increasingly gaining 
credibility and progressing towards becoming a modern military force, its power 
projection capabilities remain limited. This limitation is what constrained the PLA’s 
ability to engage in higher levels of activities across all military diplomacy activities. The 
United States, on the other hand, is supported by a military commensurate with that of a 
superpower. The U.S. military readily exercised the capabilities of a superpower military 
in interacting with the militaries of almost all Asian nations. During these interactions, 
the volumes of activities were high and occurred across a wide array of military 
diplomacy tools. 
The second section analyzed the relationships the U.S. and Chinese militaries 
maintained with what this project referred to as “strategic partners.” These Asian 
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countries displayed particular willingness to sustain a defense-centric relationship with 
either the United States or China. For the United States, these countries included Japan, 
South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Burma, North Korea, Pakistan, 
and Russia were China’s strategic partners. After assessing the relationships between 
each military and its respective strategic partners, this section concluded that barring 
significant shifts in political climate or redirection of military diplomacy effort, the 
national interests binding each relationship would mostly likely continue to hold current 
relationships in place. 
The third section examined four military diplomacy venues where the PLA 
matched or performed better than the U.S. military and assessed the implications to 
overall U.S. military diplomacy efforts in Asia. This section reasoned that there is no 
immediate threat to U.S. military diplomacy efforts in Asia because the United States’ 
widespread capacity to conduct military diplomacy in the region still surpasses that of the 
PLA. 
Finally, the last portion of this chapter addressed some important methodology 
concerns associated with how to measure the effectiveness of military diplomacy 
comprehensively in Asia. The purpose of this section is to present an alternative approach 
to measuring the impact of military diplomacy in Asia by introducing weighted values. In 
this elaborate alternative approach, weighted values can dramatically alter the way total 
impact is measured.  
This chapter analyzed the observations yielded by the last chapter and concludes 
that the U.S. military’s ability to conduct diplomacy in Asia remains strong. Even though 
the PLA is gaining competence as a military force, its capacity to conduct military 
diplomacy still remains limited when compared to the U.S. military. In this view, the U.S. 
military retains a margin of comfort for the time being. That said, the fourth section of 
this chapter attempted to emphasize the importance of not becoming complacent, based 
on the results offered by this research project, because a change in methodology can 
dramatically decrease whatever margin of comfort there may be between the U.S. 
military and PLA military diplomacy effectiveness. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS  
The previous chapter analyzed three trends: what causes the capability differential 
between the U.S. and Chinese militaries allowed the overall diplomacy activity level of 
the U.S. military to far exceed that of its Chinese counterparts; what is the nature of 
defense-centric relations between the United States and China with their respective 
strategic partners; and how the PLA’s comparable or better performance in certain 
diplomacy activities will influence the U.S. military’s overall diplomacy effort in Asia. 
This chapter considers the implications of the trends with regard to the potential 
for increased competition, cooperation or conflict. The goal is to address the question: 
Does the current context surrounding the two military’s diplomacy activities implicate 
any tendencies toward increased competition, cooperation, or conflict?  
The fundamental reason for comparing U.S. and Chinese military diplomacy 
activities in Asia is to examine how the context formed by such activities influences the 
relationship between the U.S. military and the PLA (and to figure out how to more 
effectively conduct U.S. military diplomacy). After conducting a comparative analysis 
and analyzing the underlined general trends in U.S. and Chinese military diplomacy in 
Asia, potentials for competition, cooperation, and conflict collectively emerge. However, 
as this chapter suggests, the prospect for cooperation shines brightest because 
competition has associated negative consequences, conflict is not likely, and cooperation 
has many attractive qualities. 
A. COMPETITION 
The assertion that the military diplomacy activities of the U.S. military and the 
PLA will lead to increased competition in Asia is certainly plausible. First, although the 
superpower status of the United States currently affords the U.S. military an advantage in 
conducting military diplomacy, China is arguably closing the gap with increases in 
military diplomacy as the PLA’s capabilities improve. Second, the U.S. military and 
PLA’s close relationships with different Asian countries can potentially have polarizing 
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effects by creating pockets of allegiance throughout Asia. Finally, the PLA’s use of 
different tools to engage many of the same countries the U.S. military interacts with may 
dilute the potency of U.S. influence. For these reasons, one can certainly argue for an 
increase in competition between the two militaries in conducting operations in Asia. 
Many observers agree that the PLA’s capabilities are improving. In this 
progression, the PLA’s ability to challenge the U.S. military in all facets of military 
operations is growing. The military diplomacy realm is no exception. The PLA’s 
diplomacy activity level is on the rise across the board from educational exchanges to 
joint military exercises. This dynamic has important implications for the relationships 
Washington and Beijing maintain with their respective defense partners. Whether 
bandwagoning or balancing, shifting power differentials between the U.S. and Chinese 
militaries may cause Asian countries to adjust current security relationships.  
Asian countries often see China and the United States as rivals. Regimes in the 
region have, throughout history, maintained relationships with Beijing or Washington in 
order to achieve security and stability via Sino-U.S. tension. In the presence of China’s 
mounting international power, the U.S. military remains a counterbalancing force in Asia. 
Despite the PRC’s assurances of peaceful development, “many Asian countries remain 
wary of Beijing’s intentions, and with good reasoning.” China continues to offer support 
for repressive regimes in North Korea, Burma and Cambodia, which all increase the risk 
for instability and conflict. Chinese actions often “appear schizophrenic as it pursues 
contradictory policies. Mao called this ‘walking on two legs,’ the theory being that one 
can get to the destination faster using two different approaches at the same time.”169 The 
desire to hedge against this type of an approach is what makes a security relationship 
with the United States attractive. 
To the benefit of Washington, Asian countries have good reason to see the United 
States as an attractive alternative. The U.S. military exerts influence in Asia through 
superior military projection capabilities. The nature of long-distance power projection is 
“viewed as a guarantee in two ways: geographical distance mutes its domination, and its 
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non-imperial history suggests the benignity of its power.”170 The expectation is that 
China’s rise, balanced with U.S. dominance, will offer multiple opportunities in the 
strategic realm.171 In this view, the U.S. military’s relationships with its strategic partners 
and other Asian nations should remain fairly secure. However, the PLA factor cannot be 
disregarded.  
Washington’s robust defense relationships in Asia offer no definitive assurances 
in the light of increased PLA capabilities. As noted in the previous chapter, the PLA also 
maintains strategic relationships and wide-ranging engagements through military 
diplomacy activities. This can obviously give reason for concern because, if left 
unchecked, PLA diplomacy efforts could erode the U.S. military’s influence in the 
region. As Saunders pointed out, the PLA’s military capabilities matter greatly inside 
Asia because Beijing consistently attempts to “deny Washington partners in any potential 
future effort to contain China.”172 
Saunders argues that, “geography and relative power dictate the focus of these 
efforts.” In this line of reasoning, China would be the most concerned about U.S. military 
presence in Central Asia and U.S. security ties with Taiwan because these bordering 
countries act as potential footholds for U.S. military actions. In addition, the PLA would 
also be concerned with Washington’s influence over traditional U.S. allies. These 
concerns appear to be validated by Beijing’s active attempts to build up defense 
relationships in Central Asia through the SCO, preponderant focus on fighting Taiwan, 
and increased efforts to improve relations with key U.S. allies such Thailand and the 
Philippines.173  
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Finally, Beijing displays signs of evolving towards becoming a peer competitor of 
the U.S. military through new methods of engagement in building defense ties. The PLA 
now increasingly engages defense partners through formalized institutions such as the 
SCO and ARF—an approach traditionally most often employed by the U.S. military. In 
another long time practice of the U.S. military, the PLA now also reinforces security 
relationships by improving the infrastructure of its partners. China’s direct support for the 
expansion of port facilities in Pakistan and Burma demonstrate this point. Finally yet 
importantly, like the U.S. military, the PLA has also established defense-related support 
facilities abroad, such as the signals intelligence collection facilities in Great Coco 
Islands (off the coast of Burma) and the satellite-tracking facilities in Pakistan.174 
Considered as a whole, the competition between U.S. and Chinese military 
diplomacy activities could indeed escalate. The PLA’s improved operational capabilities 
support higher activity levels. These activities can easily be construed as actions to offset 
the U.S. military influence in the region. Furthermore, the PLA appears to be becoming 
more competent in exercising military diplomacy tools. All these signs may collectively 
lead to a suspicion that military diplomacy activities conducted by the U.S. and Chinese 
militaries, in Asia, will lead to increased competition between the two forces in their bids 
for influence. 
B. COOPERATION 
The current environment created by the collective diplomacy efforts of the U.S. 
and Chinese militaries contains opportunity for cooperation. As a starting point, a 
cooperative effort of diplomacy activities between the two militaries has the potential to 
impact Asia more comprehensively. Each military is unique in maintaining activity 
levels, engaging strategic partners and employing diplomacy methods. Combining the 
two efforts would tremendously enhance not only the sphere of influence, but also the 
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depth. This, of course, is contingent upon the fact that these two militaries can be united 
by some common aims. This section will argue that since common aims exist, there is 
opportunity for military cooperation to more comprehensively impact Asia through 
military diplomacy activities. 
The different diplomacy activities of the U.S. and Chinese militaries can be 
collectivized. The U.S. military consistently upholds high levels of diplomacy activities 
in Asia. The PLA, although currently lagging behind, is increasing its activity levels. 
Given the same objectives, these two pools of activities can merge and provide an 
enhanced collective influence over Asia. 
The current context of strategic defense alliances that the two militaries maintain 
also presents opportunities for cooperation. The U.S. military sustains better relations 
with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and arguably, Thailand. China 
connects better with Burma, North Korea, Russia, and for the most part, Pakistan. 
Collectively, the U.S. and Chinese militaries are strategic partners with most of the major 
defense players in Asia. In addition to the above-mentioned strategic partners, most Asian 
nations with a significant military capability all have deep-rooted defense ties to either 
Washington or Beijing. The ability to attain impact in Asia through collaboration 
between the U.S. military and the PLA would, therefore, be nothing short of spectacular. 
In addition to cooperating on activity level engagement partners, the U.S. military 
and the PLA also have an opportunity to further enhance collective impact by exploiting 
the comparative advantage of how well each employs different engagement tools. The 
U.S. military has a notable advantage in conducting operational and tactical level 
engagements vis-à-vis high levels of interactions through conferences, joint exercises, 
and training events. The PLA tends to emphasize strategic level interactions more and is 
better entrenched in cooperation through regional organizations and conducting 
peacekeeping operations. The difference stemming from how the two militaries conduct 
military diplomacy provides opportunity for cooperation because different target 
countries may be more receptive to one approach over the other. Having a wider range of 
approaches presents the capability to reach out to Asia more effectively.  
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The potentials for improving cooperation on the military diplomacy front 
described above are encapsulated by having common interests. The main pillar of these 
common interests is a unified desire on the part of both Washington and Beijing to bring 
stability to the region. Stability in Asia is a strong unifying interest because it is in the 
interest of both countries. 
From Beijing’s perspective, maintaining a peaceful environment is important for 
achieving domestic economic and social development. For this reason, China must avoid 
conflict. To do so, China should be willing to forge common understandings with the 
United States on regional security and adopt “complementary policies or even 
partnerships on global issues that are important to both countries, such as the war on 
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and environmental protection.”175 In fact, Chinese 
officials have repeatedly reassured Washington that “China regards the U.S. military 
presence in Asia as a stabilizing factor and does not seek to push the United States out of 
Asia.”176 This is, conceivably, an indication of a willingness to cooperate on security 
matters within Asia. 
Even if an inclination to cooperate does not exist on a genuine level, Beijing still 
has reason to play a partnership role with Washington. Some observers note that the CCP 
has more broadly “preached the gospel of ‘multipolarity’ in international politics and 
sought to promote strategic partnerships with other centers of power to balance American 
hegemony.” However, such efforts have largely been unsuccessful because “most of 
Beijing’s potential partners, like China itself, depend on cooperative relationships with 
the United States, much as they may chafe at American dominance in the international 
system.”177 
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Washington shares Beijing’s desire to keep peace in the region. With the 
predominance of U.S. military focus currently dedicated to OIF and OEF, resources are 
scarce and must be employed effectively. The most effective method is, of course, to 
avert conflict. A RAND report comments on the importance of using military 
engagement to enhance stability in Central Asia, but the theme can easily be carried 
across to all of Asia. As the authors note,  
The most important objective that military engagement can serve is to help 
preserve and enhance regional stability and development…The U.S. goal, 
then, is to remain aware of actors and developments and to seek to help 
the region avoid, for example, (1) political instability that could lead to 
state failure and widespread unrest; (2) the emergence of regimes 
fundamentally opposed to U.S. interests, such as the Taliban were in 
Afghanistan; and (3) outright interstate conflict.178 
With a cohesive interest to bring stability to the region in mind, Sino-U.S. military 
ties have been improving. Even though “the old concerns remain for both sides (Beijing's 
lack of budgetary transparency, Washington's weapon sales to Taiwan), the overall trend 
is toward closer ties between the Pentagon and the PLA.” U.S. and Chinese forces 
staging their first joint search-and-rescue maneuvers in the Pacific and South China Sea 
in 2006, and Washington downplaying the unexpected surfacing of a Chinese submarine 
near a U.S. aircraft carrier later that year, serve as good indications of the warming trend. 
Providing further indications, a military-to-military hotline was established in April 2008 
to prevent potential misunderstandings as Beijing begins to project its military power 
beyond its littoral waters. Beijing even attempted to address some transparency issues by 
launching the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense, which regularly 
releases military information and holds press conferences, and rejoined the UN 
Standardized Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures in 2007.179 
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The equation for possible cooperation consists of two important parts—capability 
and will. From a capability perspective, a joint effort without doubt enhances the capacity 
to generate impact in Asia through military diplomacy. In the will part of the equation, 
the U.S. and Chinese militaries have a collective interest in maintaining stability in Asia. 
This common interest, in turn, provides common will for the two militaries to achieve the 
same end. The two militaries’ overtures toward each other through improved cooperation 
already validate an existing potential for further cooperative developments. 
C. CONFLICT 
A conflict between the U.S. military and the PLA is obviously an undesirable 
scenario. Hence, it is important to scrutinize the two countries’ military diplomacy in 
Asia in order to assess whether the two militaries’ interactions with other Asian nations 
can increase the potential for conflict with each other. In this assessment, this section 
finds that although select defense-centric activities of both countries can certainly 
become significant friction points, the Taiwan issue remains a possible flashpoint that 
could ignite large-scale conflict between the U.S. military and the PLA.  
Certain security relationships the U.S. military and the PLA sustain with 
respective security partners have the tendency to instigate a constant level of tension 
between each other. Although these tensions may lead proxy conflicts or strong 
statements of disagreement, they are unlikely to escalate into direct military confrontation 
between the United States and China. Different relationships on the Korean peninsula, in 
the India-Pakistan competition, and with Japan, are sources of such constant tensions. 
Beijing maintains close relations with Pyongyang and Washington with Seoul but most 
observers would agree that if conflict breaks out on the peninsula, it is unlikely that the 
U.S. military and the PLA will directly fight each other as they did during the Korean 
War. The same concept can be applied to the U.S. military’s relationship with Indian 
forces and the PLA’s with Pakistan. Some may also note that China sometimes criticizes 
U.S. relations with Japan. Even though these issues seem to reverberate constantly in the 
background, the level of noises does not seem indicative of serious potential for direct  
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conflict. Beyond these instances, however, lies an issue that has the highest potential for 
drawing the United States and China into direct combat with each other, and that is 
Taiwan. 
The United States maintains an active defense relationship with Taiwan through 
various military diplomacy activities. Continuing to maintain a healthy relationship with 
Taiwan is important because other states in the region “view Washington’s commitment 
to cross-strait peace and stability as an important symbol of America’s strategic interest 
in East Asia, and would view any diminution of that interest with concern.”180 In recent 
years, the U.S. military engaged Taiwan’s armed forces through various defense 
diplomacy tools. In the period from 2005 to 2007, the U.S. military activities, with 
Taiwanese counterparts, included twenty-two conferences, 53 military-to-military 
contacts, four FMS deals, 14 high-level visits, three exercises, and 30 education/PME 
exchanges. Beijing has strong opinions regarding this relationship.181  
As an independent task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations 
concluded, “Taiwan remains a potential flash point in East Asia. It is the only issue over 
which leaders of both China and the United States contemplate and conscientiously 
prepare for armed conflict.”182 This is because China views U.S. commitments to 
Taiwan’s security, especially through the provision of defense goods and services, as an 
unwelcome intrusion into China’s internal affairs. Today, as it was 35 years ago, “Taiwan 
remains a top concern of China’s leaders, and it is never far from their minds when they 
consider their relations with the United States.”183 This is reflected in China’s 2008 
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Defense White Papers where U.S. weapon sales to Taiwan and increased military 
presence in the Asia-Pacific region are still cited as top security concerns for China.184  
Conflicting military objectives over Taiwan creates a “powerful dynamic of 
mistrust” and could lead to a conflict neither intended nor desired by either side. As the 
CFR sponsored task force concludes, “Until some level of political accommodation is 
reached in cross-strait relations, even on an interim basis, Washington and Beijing have 
to continue to manage their differences on Taiwan rather than resolve them.”185 In the 
context of the current situation, Taiwan remains the sole sticking point between Beijing 
and Washington that can potentially bring about direct military confrontation.  
1. The Optimistic Future Prospect 
Military diplomacy builds relationships by fulfilling or accommodating the needs 
or desires of security partners. While military diplomacy can be an effective tool in some 
situations, the extent of its utility, like any other tool, may diminish in others. Military 
diplomacy is most likely to be effective in reducing the potentials for conflict resulting 
from mutual uncertainties with regard to each other’s intentions, the threatening potential 
of other states’ military power or historically inherited mistrust. The effectiveness of 
military diplomacy in fostering cooperative relationships become more limited in 
situations where potentials for conflict result from specific “real and substantive political 
differences, whether over specific issues such as territory and borders or over wider 
questions such as the norms underpinning international politics or the international 
balance of power.”186 From this perspective, this section proposes that there are 
optimistic prospects for future cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese militaries in 
conducting diplomatic activities in Asia.  
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The optimism for cooperative prospects is based on three lines of reasoning. First, 
while there may be some benefit to be gained through direct competition in conducting 
military diplomacy activities, the margin of benefits are small because security partners 
are unlikely to significantly alter the stance on major political issues framing individual 
security concerns. Second, until the PLA’s capabilities reach peer competitor status with 
respect to U.S. military capabilities, direct military confrontation would be an irrational 
and costly choice. Finally, having common objectives in Asia, combined with China’s 
desire to develop a more international role, should encourage cooperation between the 
U.S. and Chinese militaries. 
Competing with the U.S. military through employing the tools of military 
diplomacy is not in Beijing’s best interest. As previously noted, the PLA engages in 
security relations with many of the same Asian countries as the U.S. military. Since 
strategic national interests underpin most of these relationships, drastic shifts in the 
climate of current relationships are unlikely. While China has increased its frequency of 
defense-centric activities with traditional U.S. security partners such as Japan, South 
Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and India, such activities are not likely to alter 
the political reasons these countries have for maintaining close ties to the United States. 
In this view, the PLA’s diplomacy efforts reduce the potential for conflict with these 
countries but do not have significant impact in degrading U.S. ties to the same countries. 
China has to keep these dynamics in mind when conducting military diplomacy because 
hyperactivity from the PLA could result in a net loss in influence. 
The PLA must be diligent in its activities because an overly aggressive diplomacy 
effort can cause negative consequences. While developing security relations with a 
specific country may reduce conflict with that particular country, an overly aggressive 
effort may be construed as threatening to the U.S. military and other countries in the 
region as well. Beijing is very well aware that external threat perceptions can prompt 
balancing or containment policies against China. China’s “Peaceful Rise” and later 
“Peaceful Development” slogans reflect this awareness. From this perspective, the PLA 
has no reason to provoke competition with the U.S. military through its diplomatic ties 
with security partners. 
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The PLA also has no reason to provoke an all out military confrontation with the 
U.S. military. While the PLA has undertaken tremendous military modernization, its 
forces are still not in a position to confront the U.S. military. As the CFR reports, “China 
is making progress toward being able to fight and win a war with Taiwan (absent U.S. 
intervention), and it is also beginning to build capabilities to safeguard its growing global 
interests.”187 While these capabilities, including anti-satellite systems, pose challenges 
for the United States, there is no evidence to support the notion that China will become a 
peer military competitor of the United States. In the words of a CFR task force,  
By virtue of its heritage and experience, its equipment and level of 
technology, its personnel, and the resources it spends, the United States 
enjoys space, air, and naval superiority over China. The military balance 
today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors the United States and 
its allies.188  
The PLA is well aware of this capability differential, and consequently, will see it as a 
deterrent in the process of considering full-scale military conflict. This is, of course, not 
to say that a power differential alone will guarantee conflict aversion. 
Beijing must consider other imperatives in its decision-making process. One of 
the most frequent arguments advocated by authors such as Susan Shirk suggests that 
hyper-nationalism among Chinese citizens can force Beijing into conflict. The basic 
premise is that the CCP employs nationalism as a tool to unite the population in a way 
that spring-loads the Chinese people for over-reaction on certain issues (i.e., incidents 
with Taiwan). The argument is reasonable and should be carefully considered. However, 
this is simply suggesting that barring any unforeseen catastrophic events that arouse 
reactions beyond the crises management capabilities of the CCP, cooperation on all 
fronts, including military diplomacy, is a more attractive option for Beijing. 
Cooperating with the U.S. military in exerting influence in Asia offers Beijing 
important benefits. China’s military capabilities are improving, but are still constrained 
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by some inherent limitations including power projection capability. Hence, with stability 
on its periphery, and in the region in general still being a primary concern, China has no 
reason to reject U.S. presence in Asia completely. For the sake of stability, the two 
militaries can collectively engage in numerous issues. 
The interest of maintaining stability in Asia presents Washington and Beijing with 
compatible agendas. Both the United States and China continue to have common stakes 
in “maintaining stability in the perennially crisis-prone areas of the Korean peninsula and 
the Taiwan Strait, where the recent warming of relations has reduced the tensions in 
trilateral interactions that characterized Chen Shui-bian’s presidency.” In addition, 
China’s long-standing relationship with Pakistan provides “promising foundations for 
progress” under the new U.S. administration.189 
Beyond the common interests above, Beijing has additional reasons to cooperate 
with Washington on military matters. China’s cooperation with the United States in the 
realm of military diplomacy will also help usher China more squarely into the 
international spotlight. Beijing has apparent ambitions to emerge into a more significant 
international role. China’s most recent white papers clearly emphasize China's new place 
in the world. The document describes the country as an indispensable nation: “China 
cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity 
and stability without China.” As Adam Wolfe notes in his article “China: New Defense 
Posture,” “While this emphasis is likely to cause concern in capitals around the world, it 
also opens the door for greater cooperation with China's neighbors and the U.S.”190 
This section has argued that the prospects for future Sino-U.S. cooperation in Asia 
are optimistic. This optimism rests on three reasons. The first is that competition can have 
negative impacts. The PLA would only be disadvantaged by increased competition if 
such actions lead to balancing or containment strategies from the United States and 
neighbors. Second, the PLA is not likely to challenge the U.S. military in direct conflict 
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because its capabilities remain inferior. While there may be more imperative reasons for 
choosing conflict in catastrophic scenarios, cooperation is a far more attractive 
alternative. Finally, common interests provide both the United States and PRC motivation 
for improving military cooperation in conducting diplomacy in Asia. Both countries have 
a stake in regional stability and China has additional motivation stemming from Beijing’s 
desire to fulfill a larger international role. 
2. Summary 
The diplomacy activity gap between the U.S. military and PLA is narrowing. 
While the U.S. military has and continues to sustain a high level of diplomacy activities 
via security cooperation relationships in Asia, the PLA is certainly expanding its 
influence through increased activities. After comparing how the two militaries engaged in 
defense-centric relationships in Asia, and analyzing what motivated those patterns, this 
chapter assessed what implications these defense diplomacy activities hold for the future 
of military-to-military relations between the United States and China. The assessment 
finds that the context created by current activities and relationships can offer persuasive 
supporting evidence for competition, cooperation, or conflict. However, the prospect for 
cooperation appears the most evident. While competition can offer marginal benefits by 
improving relationships with specific nations, associated negative threat perceptions 
negate net gains in consolidating influence. Even though conflict over central security 
differences can arise, either country stands to benefit and the PLA’s deficit in capability 
will surely lead to a costly conclusion. In contrast to both militaries suffering 
unconstructive consequences in a direct confrontation, regional cooperation through the 
realm of conduction, military diplomacy stands to benefit both the United States and 
China by bringing enhanced stability to the region via a consolidated ability to exert 
influence throughout Asia. In this view, cooperation between the U.S. and Chinese 
militaries is not only likely, but also the most rational choice. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
The inspiration for this thesis stemmed from a desire to grasp the potential 
implications better of the PLA’s improving capabilities. While the capability 
developments of the PLA have occurred across many facets, one particular area, military 
diplomacy, captured this author’s interest. Along with China’s growing ability to exert 
influence in the world, the PLA is demonstrating increased aptitude for functioning as an 
instrument of diplomacy. Since the PLA’s global force projection capacity still remains 
limited, its diplomatic efforts are most evident in Asia. This circumstance provided the 
departure point of this research project, which was to examine how the PLA’s diplomacy 
efforts in Asia can potentially impact the U.S. military’s corresponding efforts within the 
same region.  
Using military diplomacy, the PLA is increasingly interacting with more of the 
same Asian countries the U.S. military engages through security relationships. In this 
context, the expanding scope of the PLA’s diplomatic activities can redefine not only 
U.S. security relationships with Asian countries, but also Sino-U.S. military relations. 
The ultimate aim of this thesis was to assess how Sino-U.S. military relations will be 
affected by the simultaneous diplomacy efforts of both militaries—will the PLA’s 
increased level of diplomacy activities shift the Sino-U.S. military relationship towards 
competition, cooperation, or conflict? 
Chapter I set the stage for the research effort with two significant steps. It defined 
the diplomacy objectives of both the U.S. and Chinese militaries by tracing through the 
various inputs each military received from their respective governing authorities. The role 
of U.S. military diplomacy that emerges from the objectives outlined by the NSS, 
Strategic Plan, NDS, and NMS, is to support U.S. foreign policy by shaping a global 
environment that promotes security and deters conflict through building alliances, 
diffusing regional conflicts, promoting international understanding, and strengthening 
diplomatic and program capabilities. The PLA’s objectives, framed by the policies of the 
CPC, Foreign Ministry, and CMC, are summarized as strengthening China’s ability to 
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preserve sovereignty and territorial integrity, create a favorable international environment 
for China's economic growth, and expand Chinese participation in shaping the world’s 
security environment.  
In addition to outlining the diplomatic objectives of the two militaries, Chapter I 
also outlined how defense diplomacy activities will be categorized in the comparison 
process. All the activities falling under the military diplomacy umbrella were separated 
into four broad categories: Strategic-level activities, regional activities, professional 
military exchanges, and cooperation on non-traditional security areas. Each category 
encompassed specific activities that served as the framework for organizing activities 
constituted as military diplomacy.191  
After setting the stage in Chapter I, the following chapter summarized and 
compared the defense diplomacy activities conducted by both the U.S. and Chinese 
militaries. Through this process, disparities in three particular areas emerged—the overall 
activity level, choices in strategic engagement partners, and preferred diplomacy tools. In 
overall activity level, the volume of U.S. military diplomacy activities was far higher than 
that of its Chinese counterparts. In the realm of maintaining strategic partners, political 
interests provided dense security ties between the U.S. military and Japan, South Korea, 
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Similar relationships existed between the PLA 
and Pakistan, Russia, Burma and North Korea. In the effort to sustain security 
relationships, the U.S. military took a well-balanced approach to exercising all the tools 
available under the umbrella of military diplomacy. The PLA efforts were less balanced 
and particularly concentrated on conducting defense consultations and strategic 
dialogues, state-to-state military protocols, participation in regional forums, and 
peacekeeping operations. The level of focus in these areas allowed the PLA to either 
match or exceed U.S. performance in the same areas. 
Upon observing the differences that emerged from the comparison, Chapter III 
analyzed the differences in detail by examining the reasons for such differences. The 
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detailed examination revealed three observations. First, the overall military diplomacy 
activity level disparity between the U.S. and Chinese militaries can be attributed to 
disproportions in military capabilities between the two forces. The U.S. military affords 
the United States power projection capabilities commensurate with that of a superpower. 
The PLA does not have comparable resources and therefore is not able to match U.S. 
performances across all defense diplomacy activities. Second, vital national interests of 
defense partners underpin the strategic defense relationships maintained by both 
militaries. This implies that barring significant shifts in political climates or adjustments 
to current military diplomacy efforts, the security relationships between the U.S. and 
Chinese militaries and their respective security remain in place. With the exception of 
Thailand and Pakistan, most U.S. or Chinese strategic partners appear to be deeply rooted 
in their security relationships with either military. Third, there is no immediate threat to 
U.S. military diplomacy efforts in Asia because the United States’ widespread capacity to 
conduct military diplomacy in the region still surpasses that of the PLA. While the PLA’s 
efforts are notable in some diplomacy activities, the U.S. military is still dominating most 
of diplomacy activities. 
Once the differences were analyzed in detail, Chapter IV assessed the 
implications the activities had on increasing the potential for competition, cooperation or 
conflict between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. The assessment found that while the 
context created by current activities and relationships offered persuasive evidence for 
competition, cooperation and conflict, the evidence suggesting further cooperation 
appeared the most evident. Competition had marginal benefits to offer by improving 
relationships with specific nations. However, associated negative consequences, most 
predominantly, increased threat perceptions, negated net gains in enhancing net 
influence, making increased competition an unproductive, and hence, undesirable 
approach. Conflict would be an even more undesirable approach because both the United 
States and China stand to lose from conflict. For China, the inferior military capabilities 
of the PLA would lead to costly losses. For the United States, becoming involved in a 
conflict with China undermines its credibility as a stabilizing force in Asia. The negative 
qualities of competition and conflict imply that regional cooperation through military 
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diplomacy affords both countries the best opportunity to enhance stability in the region 
and consolidate influence throughout Asia. After all, stability is consistent with the 
military diplomacy objectives of both the U.S. and Chinese militaries. 
A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addressing China’s increased activism in employing the PLA as a diplomatic 
tool, varying policy approaches can yield significantly different results. Consequently, 
formulating coherent policies is crucial. Based on the analysis of this research project, the 
most ideal U.S. military response in the current situation is to pursue a policy that 
encourages a contingent-based cooperative military-to-military relationship with the 
PLA.  
A contingent-based cooperative approach mirrors Former Deputy Secretary of 
State Robert Zoellick’s idea of inviting China to become a “responsible stakeholder.”192 
Acknowledging China’s emergences on the world stage, Zoellick emphasized the 
importance of China’s character and content in projecting global influence.193 He called 
on China to assume more responsibility in upholding international rules, norms, and 
organizations. In exchange, China would gain greater influence in working with the 
United States “to Shape the future international system.”194 Observers agree, “Playing the 
role of a responsible stakeholder would not only advance China’s national interests, but 
also allow Beijing to pursue a larger regional and global role without sparking a 
destabilizing competition with Washington.”195 Zoellick also emphasized that the United 
States and China should cooperate in pursuing common interests because cooperation can 
provide common benefits, including benefits with regard to improved security.196 
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A CFR task force echoes the recommendation for increased cooperation. The 
Task Force finds that U.S. strategy toward China should be focused on “an affirmative 
agenda of integrating China into the global community, thereby helping to shape China’s 
self-interest in ways that will build on areas of existing cooperation and create new 
opportunities for collaboration on regional and global challenges.” In the task force’s 
view, integration is the responsible course.197 The level of integration should, of course, 
be contingent upon China’s increased responsible behavior.  
Along this line of thought, China’s behavior in recent years provides good 
motivation for improving integration and cooperation. Beijing has already demonstrated 
increased responsibility in conducting defense-centric interactions in recent years. From 
the 1980s through the mid-1990s, arms sales and exports of technology for weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missiles were important sources of Chinese 
influence. In great contrast, China now has a predominantly conventional military 
technology and places greater emphasis on military diplomacy and capacity-building 
programs.198 China’s overall global arms exports have declined dramatically—from a 
high point in 1987 of $5.8 billion to only $300 million in 2003 and $600 million in 
2004.199 
Replacing the diminishing activities in arm sales is China’s increasing emphasis 
on military diplomacy. China has stepped up its military diplomacy activities 
dramatically since late 2001. According to China’s 2008 Defense White Paper,  
China has established military ties with over 150 countries, and has 
military attaché offices in 109 countries. A total of 98 countries have 
military attaché offices in China. In the past two years senior PLA 
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delegations have visited more than 40 countries, and defense ministers and 
chiefs of the general staff from more than 60 countries have visited 
China.200  
In this view, China’s method to building defense ties has become less threatening and 
more cooperative by employing less hardware-based and more relationship-based 
approaches. China’s new style better conforms to the international stands Zoellick spoke 
of in his 2005 speech and therefore displays increased indications of becoming a 
“responsible stakeholder.” 
Based on the movement towards becoming more responsible as a stakeholder, 
U.S. policy should honor the contingent-based understanding by affording China greater 
international roles. Military policy governing military diplomacy ought to, therefore, 
reflect corresponding gestures. From this perspective, the U.S. military should 
accommodate a great PLA role in Asia through increased regional cooperation. The 2007 
Council Task Force report reflects this line of reasoning by proposing that the best way 
for the United States to ensure that its security interests in the region are not 
compromised by China's growing military capabilities is to strengthen security alliances 
with China's neighbors in the effort to help draw China into constructive security 
relationships.201 China’s new roles in constructive relationships can then facilitate 
achieving common interests in Asia with the U.S. military. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This thesis suggests two additional areas for study to further perpetuate better 
understanding of military diplomacy. First, further research efforts into which countries 
or regions associate the most importance can aid the better understanding of military 
diplomacy effectiveness. As indicated in Chapter IV, attaching weighted values to 
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different military diplomacy tools can greatly affect how resulting impact is measured. 
The resources supporting military diplomacy, like any other resources, are limited. 
Consequently, a significant effort should be made towards understanding how resources 
can be employed most effectively in garnering desired impact. Ascertaining a thorough 
understanding ensures the most efficient opportunities to gain the greatest amount of 
effectiveness while expending the least amount of resources.  
The quest for comprehensive efficiency will be a daunting task indeed. Defense 
diplomacy is about building relationships by catering to the needs and desires of 
partnering countries or regions. Since the needs and desires of countries and regions are 
likely to vary, one must seek to understand what issues are the most important to specific 
countries or regions, and furthermore, understand those issues from the partner country or 
region’s perspective.  
In applying this concept to Asia, a research effort should attempt to determine 
accurate country-specific weighted values for each defense diplomacy activity. The study 
should start with the most influential players in Asia, such as Japan, China, and South 
Korea. This effort would help shape the future course of U.S. military diplomacy 
activities and would enable a more meaningful comparison of diplomacy efforts between 
the U.S. and Chinese militaries.  
The second area of study deals with refining the estimation of PLA defense 
diplomacy activities within the context of current underpinning issues—specifically the 
global economic downturn. The basic question is how will the global economic 
slowdown affect PLA diplomacy efforts? The PLA’s resources are becoming scarcer, 
which constrains the PLA’s budget for additional capability enhancements, thereby 
possibly directly affecting PLA diplomacy activities. Furthermore, the PLA has a 
mandate to assist in maintaining domestic stability. In the face of China’s economic 
downturn, socioeconomic disturbances within China may rise and force the PLA to 
redirect its already limited resources. In this sense, the economic situation of the current 




diplomacy activities. Therefore, the PLA may be forced to prepare for budget cuts and 
integrate diplomacy activities with preparations for increased possibilities for domestic 
unrest.  
The PLA, already to some extent, integrates defense diplomacy and domestic 
stability interest. For example, the PLA’s cooperation through the SCO in conducting 
anti-terrorism exercises affords China the chance to build defense relations while 
preparing for civil unrest concurrently. Beijing attaches tremendous significance to such 
issues, as reflected through its reiterates on the need to fight against the three isms—
extremism, terrorism and separatism. The question is how much more integration can 
take place before Beijing must start making concessions in the defense diplomacy realm 
in order to address domestic stability issues? Furthermore, what implications will 
Beijing’s decisions have for U.S. military diplomacy efforts in Asia? If Washington starts 
to engage Beijing in a partnership capacity in conducting military diplomacy, what 
potential implications will arise from the PLA role amidst changing circumstances?  
Further research efforts are required to determine the answers to the above 
questions. The areas for further study proposed by this thesis should help perpetuate the 
continuous effort to understand military diplomacy against the backdrop of Sino-U.S. 
military relations. Whether from the policymakers’ perspective or the perspective of a 
military officer, developing and maintaining such understandings is imperative in 
engaging one of the world’s most capable military forces.  
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APPENDIX A. ARMS TRANSFERS 
A. U.S. ARMS TRANSFERS 
Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by recipient. Deals with 
deliveries or orders made for year range 2001 to 2007 
Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient 
was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the 
deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at 
URL <http://armstrade.sipri.org/>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available. 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
Information generated: 24 November 2008 
 
   
Recipient/    Year Year(s) No.  
 supplier (S) No. Weapon Weapon of order/ of delivered/  




S: USA (19) BTA-5.9 Diesel engine (AV) (2002) 2003-2004 (19) For modernization of 16 Scorpion tanks, 2 Sultan 
APC/CP and 1 Samson ARV; ordered via UK 
  
India 
S: USA 122 TPE-331 Turboprop 1983 1986-2006 (102) For 61 Do-228 MP aircraft from FRG 
  (6) LM-2500 Gas turbine (SH) (1999)   For 3 Shivalik (Project-17) frigates produced in India; 
possibly from Italian production line 
  8 AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Arty locating radar 2002 2006 8 Part of $142-190 m deal; originally planned for 1998 
but embargoed by USA after Indian nuclear tests in 
1998; AN/TPQ-37(V)3 version 
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  4 AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder Arty locating radar 2003 2006-2007 4 Part of $142-190 m deal; AN/TPQ-37(V)3 version 
  4 LM-2500 Gas turbine (SH) (2003)   For 1 IAC (ADS) aircraft carrier produced in India; 
probably from Italian production line 
  17 F-404 Turbofan 2004   $105 m deal; for Tejas (LCA) combat aircraft produced 
in India; F404-GE-IN20 version; ordered after Indian 
Kaveri engine delayed 
  1 Austin AALS 2006 2007 1 Ex-US; INR2.2 b ($48 m) deal (incl modernization) 
  6 S-61R/HH-3E/F Helicopter 2006 2007 (6) Ex-US; $39 m deal; UH-3H version; del 2007 
  6 C-130J Hercules-2 Transport aircraft (2007)   $1 b deal; contract not yet signed 




S: USA 48 CT-7 Turboprop (1990) 1993-2004 (48) For 24 CN-235 transport and CN-235MPA MP aircraft 
produced in Indonesia; CT-7-9C3 version 
  16 AN/APG-66 Aircraft radar 1996 1999-2007 (16) For 16 Hawk-200 combat aircraft from UK; status of 
last 6 uncertain after US arms embargo during 1999-
2006 against Indonesia 
  1 F-5E Tiger-2 FGA aircraft (1996) 2006 1 Second-hand; modernized in USA; delivery embargoed 
by USA 1999-2006 
  8 Caterpillar-3516 Diesel engine (SH) (2000) 2002-2005 (8) For modernization of 4 Parchim (Patimura) corvettes 
  
Japan 
S: USA . . F-110 Turbofan (1987) 2000-2007 (85) For F-2 combat aircraft produced in Japan; F-110-GE-
129 version 
  (38) Mk-15 Phalanx CIWS (1993) 1996-2007 (38) For 2 Improved Kongou destroyers, 9 Murasame and 5 
Takanami frigates and 3 Oosumi AALS produced in 
Japan; incl some Block-1B version 
  6 LCAC Landing craft 1994 1997-2002 (6)  
  (56) AE-2100 Turboprop (1996) 2007 8 For 14 US-2 (US-1AKai) MP aircraft produced in 
Japan; AE-2100J version 
  (20) King Air-350/C-12S Light transport ac 1997 1999-2007 (13) Incl for reconnaissance; Japanese designation LR-2 
  40 AIM-120B AMRAAM BVRAAM (1998) 2001-2003 (40) Deal worth $22 m 
  (16) RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM 1999 2001 (16)  
  (13) AN/APS-145 AEW aircraft radar 2000 2004-2007 (10) For modernization of 13 E-2C AEW&C aircraft to 
Hawkeye-2000 
  2 Gulfstream-5 Transport aircraft 2001 2003-2004 (2) Deal worth $100 m; modified in Netherlands before 
delivery to long-range MP aircraft; for Coast Guard; 
incl for use against piracy in South-East Asia 
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  16 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM 2001 2003 16 $27 m deal; possibly SM-2 Block-3B version 
  (16) RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2001) 2003 16 $27 m deal; SM-2 Block-3A version 
  6 AN/SPG-62 Fire control radar (2002) 2007 3 For 2 Improved Kongou/Atagou destroyers produced in 
Japan; for use with Standard SAM 
  2 AN/SPY-1D Air surv radar 2002 2007 1 For 2 Improved Kongou/Atagou destroyers produced in 
Japan 
  (400) BGM-71F TOW-2B Anti-tank missile 2002 2003-2004 (400) Part of $52 m deal; TOW-2A/TOW-2B version 
  16 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2002) 2004 (16) $24 m deal; SM-2 Block-3A version 
  . . FIM-92 Stinger Portable SAM (2003) 2006-2007 (30) AIM-92 version; for AH-64D combat helicopters 
  4 KC-767 Tanker/transport ac 2003   'KC-X' programme; KC-767J version; delivery 2008-
2010 
  18 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2003)   SM-2 Block-3B version 
  . . RIM-162 ESSM SAM 2004   For Takanami and Murasame frigates 
  (32) MIM-104 PAC-3 SAM 2005 2006-2007 (32) Part of $6.5-9.3 b anti-ballistic missile defence system 
  40 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2005)   SM-2 Block-3B version 
  44 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2006)   $70 m deal; SM-2 Block-3B version 
 
L:  (80) T-64 Turboprop (1970) 1975-2005 (80) For 20 US-1A MP aircraft produced in Japan, T-64-IHI-
10J version 
  210 Hughes-500E/M Light helicopter 1977 1978-2001 (210) OH-6D and OH-6DA version; incl for training 
  86 CH-47D Chinook Helicopter 1984 1986-2007 (83) CH-47J and CH-47JA version; 84 produced in Japan 
  (62) LM-2500 Gas turbine (SH) (1988) 1993-2007 47 For 2 FD aircraft-carriers, 4 Kongou and 2 Improved 
Kongou/Atagou destroyers, 5 Takanami and 9 
Murasame frigates and 1 Asuka research ship 
produced in Japan 
  (147) S-70B/SH-60B Seahawk ASW helicopter 1988 1991-2007 (127) SH-60J and SH-60K version 
  (67) S-70/UH-60L Blackhawk Helicopter 1988 1990-2007 (57) S-70A-12/UH-60J version 
  (27) SeaVue MP aircraft radar 1992 1995-2007 (27) For 27 BAe-125-800/RH-800 (U-125A) MP aircraft 
from UK and USA 
  (350) AIM-7M Sparrow BVRAAM 1993 1996-2006 (350) For Murasame and Takanami frigates; RIM-7M Sea 
Sparrow (SAM) version 
  (90) M-270 MLRS 227mm MRL 1993 1995-2006 (90)  
  (21) BAe-125-800 Light transport ac 1995 1998-2007 (20) 'H-X' programme; RH-800 or Hawker-800 version; 
modified in Japan for SAR; Japanese designation U-
125A 
  (80) S-70/UH-60L Blackhawk Helicopter 1995 1998-2007 (27) $2.7 b deal; UH-60JA version 
  18 LM-500 Gas turbine (SH) (1999) 2002-2004 18 For 6 Hayabusa FAC produced in Japan; LM-500-G-07 
version 
  (13) AH-64D Apache Combat helicopter 2001 2006-2007 (6) 'AH-X' programme; AH-64DJP version 
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  2 Mk-45-4 127mm Naval gun 2003 2007 1 For 2 Improved Kongou/Atagou destroyers produced in 
Japan 
  9 RIM-66/SM-3 SAM (2006) 2007 (3) Part of $6.5-9.3 b anti-ballistic missile defence system 
(incl production of components in Japan); SM-3 
Block-1 version; for Kongou destroyers 
  
Kazakhstan 
S: USA 6 Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2 Helicopter (2003) 2004 (6) Ex-US UH-1H rebuilt to Huey-2; aid against terrorists 
  2 Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2 Helicopter 2007 2007 (2) Option on 6 more 
  (40) M-1114 ECV APC/ISV 2007   M-1151 version; delivery 2008-2009 
  
Malaysia 
S: USA 12 T-800 Turboshaft 1999 2003-2004 12 For 12 Super Lynx-300 helicopters from UK 
  211 6V-53 Diesel engine (AV) 2000 2002-2004 (211) For 211 AIFV (ACV-300) IFV/APC from Turkey; 6V-
53T version 
  12 Caterpillar-3616 Diesel engine (SH) 2000 2006 4 For 6 MEKO-A100 (Kedah) frigates from FRG 
  31 Sharpshooter IFV turret 2000 2002-2003 (31) For 31 AIFV (ACV-300) IFV from Turkey 
  6 RDR-1500 MP aircraft radar (2001) 2003-2004 (6) For 6 AS-555SN helicopters from France 
  . . CT-7 Turboprop 2002 2005-2006 (4) For 2 CN-235 transport aircraft from Indonesia; CT-7-
9C3 version 
  20 AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM (2005) 2007 (20) AIM-120C-5 version 
  2 RGM-84 Harpoon Anti-ship missile (2005) 2006 2 AGM-84A version 
  
Pakistan 
S: USA (250) 6V-53 Diesel engine (AV) (2000) 2005-2006 (250) For Talha APC and Al Qaswa ALV produced in 
Pakistan 
  5 Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2 Helicopter (2001) 2002 5 Ex-US UH-1H rebuilt to Huey-2; part of $73 m US aid 
for Afghan border patrol 
  6 CT-7 Turboprop 2002 2004 (6) For 3 CN-235 transport aircraft from Indonesia; CT-7-
9C3 version 
  (6) L-88 LASS Air surv radar (2003)   $155 m deal; for surveillance of border area with 
Afghanistan; status uncertain 
  19 T-37B Trainer aircraft 2003 2004 (19) Ex-US; aid 
  (20) Bell-209/AH-1F Combat helicopter 2004 2007 (20) Ex-US; modernized before delivery; 20 more for spares 
only 
  26 Bell-412 Helicopter 2004 2004-2005 26 Originally $230 m deal for 2 year lease but given to 
Pakistan in 2007; from Canadian production line; for 
use in 'war on terrorism'; incl some for police; Bell-
412EP version 
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  (2014) BGM-71 TOW Anti-tank missile (2004) 2006-2007 (1500) $82 m deal; TOW-2A version; for AH-1 combat 
helicopters 
  6 C-130E Hercules Transport aircraft 2004 2005-2007 (6) Ex-Australian aircraft sold back to US producer and 
sold to Pakistan; $64 m deal; modernized before 
delivery; 1 more for spares only 
  300 AIM-9L/M Sidewinder SRAAM 2005 2007 300 $29 m deal; AIM-9M1/2 version 
  6 AN/TPS-77 Air surv radar 2005   $89 m deal; delivery by 2009 
  2 F-16A FGA aircraft 2005 2005 2 Ex-US (but only used 2 years); originally produced for 
Pakistan but delivery embargoed and delivered to 
USA; aid 
  115 M-109A5 155mm Self-propelled gun (2005)   Ex-US; $56 m deal; status uncertain 
  8 P-3CUP Orion ASW/MP aircraft 2005 2007 2 Ex-US P-3C version rebuilt to P-3CUP in USA ( (paid 
with US aid worth up to $970 m); delivery 2007-
2009/2010 
  60 RGM-84L Harpoon-2 Anti-ship missile 2005 2006 (60) $61 m deal; incl 40 AGM-84 version 
  2 SA-316B Alouette-3 Light helicopter 2005 2006 2 Second-hand; SA-319B version 
  (24) F-16C FGA aircraft (2006) 2007 (6) Ex-US F-16A modernized to F-16AM before delivery; 
aid 
  18 F-16C Block-50/52 FGA aircraft 2006   $1.5 b deal (part of $5 b deal); incl 6 F-16D; option on 
18 more 
  500 JDAM Guided bomb (2006)    
  6 Mk-15 Phalanx CIWS 2006   Part of $155 m deal (incl modernization of 6 Pakistani 
Phalanx) 
  3 P-3 AEW Orion AEW&C aircraft (2006)   $855 m deal; contract not yet signed 
  (1600) Paveway Guided bomb (2006)    
  2 TF-50 Gas turbine (SH) 2006 2007 1 For MRTP-33 FAC delivered by Turkey 
  (18) AAQ-33 Sniper Aircraft El/Op system 2007   For F-16 combat aircraft 
  500 AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM 2007   $265 m deal; AIM-120C-5 version; for F-16 combat 
aircraft; delivery 2008-2011 
  200 AIM-9L/M Sidewinder SRAAM 2007   AIM-9M8 and AIM-9M9 version; for F-16 combat 
aircraft 
  34 AN/APG-68 Aircraft radar 2007   AN/APG-68(V)9 version; for 'Mid-Life Update' (MLU) 
modernization of 34 F-16A combat aircraft to F-
16AM (F-16C) version; delivery from 2008 
  3198 BGM-71 TOW Anti-tank missile (2007)   $185 m deal; incl 2769 TOW-2A and 415 TOW-2RF; 
contract not yet signed 





S: USA 8 Bell-205/UH-1H Helicopter 2001 2002-2003 8 Ex-US; aid 
  1 C-130B Hercules Transport aircraft (2001) 2001 1 Ex-US; aid 
  1 Cyclone Patrol craft (2001) 2004 1 Ex-US; aid; Philippine designation Alvares 
  (1) 6V-53 Diesel engine (AV) (2002) 2004 (1) For 1 AIFV ARV from Turkey 
  4 C-130H Hercules Transport aircraft (2002)   Ex-UK C-130K version sold back to US producer; $41 
m deal; modernized before delivery; incl for MP 
  20 Bell-205/UH-1H Helicopter 2003 2007 (20) Ex-US; part of $30 m aid (incl 10 more for spares) 
  (7) Bell-205/UH-1H Helicopter 2003 2004-2005 (7) Second-hand; part of $12 m deal; ordered and delivered 
via Singapore; modernized in Singapore before 
delivery 
  (6) Bell-205/UH-1H Helicopter 2003 2006-2007 (6) Ex-US; $8.2 m deal; modernized before delivery 
  48 M-113 APC (2003) 2006 (48) Ex-US; aid 
 
L:  2 Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2 Helicopter 1997 2005 (2) Philippine UH-1H rebuilt to Huey-2; assembled from 
kits in Philippines 
  
Singapore 
S: USA (500) 6V-92 Diesel engine (AV) (1995) 1997-2004 (500) For Bionix IFV produced in Singapore 
  6 CH-47D Chinook Helicopter 1998 2000-2001 (6) CH-47SD version 
  8 AH-64D Apache Combat helicopter 1999 2002 (8) Part of 'Peace Vanguard' deal worth $620 m (incl $26 m 
for Longbow radars); stationed in USA until 2006 
  (20) AIM-7M Sparrow BVRAAM (2000) 2001 20  
  (60) AIM-9L/M Sidewinder SRAAM (2000) 2001 60 AIM-9S version 
  20 F-16C Block-50/52 FGA aircraft (2000) 2004-2005 (20) 'Peace Carvin-4' deal; F-16D Block-52+ version 
  2 S-70/UH-60L Blackhawk Helicopter 2000 2002 (2)  
  (192) AGM-114K HELLFIRE Anti-tank missile (2001) 2005 (192) For AH-64D helicopters 
  12 AH-64D Apache Combat helicopter 2001 2005 (12) $617 m 'Peace Vanguard' deal; stationed in USA until 
2006 
  100 AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM 2001 2002-2003 (100) $85-100 m deal; for F-16 and possibly F-5S combat 
aircraft; stored in USA until 2003 when delivered to 
Singapore after China and Viet Nam introduced 
similar AA-12 missiles in 2002/2003 
  18 AN/AAQ-14 LANTIRN Aircraft radar 2001 2004-2005 (18) For F-16 combat aircraft 
  54 M-109 chassis Gun chassis (2001) 2001-2005 (54) For use as chassis of Primus self-propelled gun 
produced in Singapore (with Singaporean 155mm gun 
turret) 
  50 AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM 2004 2006 (50) $25 m deal; AIM-120C-5 version 
  (60) AGM-154 JSOW ASM (2005)   For F-15SG combat aircraft; status uncertain 
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  12 F-15E Strike Eagle Fighter/bomber ac 2005   $1 b 'NFRP' programme; F-15SG version; delivery 
2008-2009 
  6 S-70B/SH-60B Seahawk ASW helicopter 2005   SH-70(N) version; delivery 2008-2010 
  (100) AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM (2006)   For F-15SG combat aircraft; AIM-120C-5 version 
  (200) AIM-9X Sidewinder SRAAM (2006)   For F-15SG combat aircraft 
  50 JDAM Guided bomb (2006)    
  12 F-15E Strike Eagle Fighter/bomber ac 2007   F-15SG version; delivery from 2010 
  4 Gulfstream-5 Transport aircraft 2007   G-550 version; for modification to AEW aircraft; 
delivery 2008-2010 
  84 Paveway Guided bomb (2007)   Incl 28 GBU-10 and 56 GBU-12 version 
  
South Korea 
S: USA (75) RGM-84 Harpoon Anti-ship missile (1994) 1998-2004 (75) UGM-84 version; for Type-209 (Chang Bogo) 
submarines 
  (150) Mk-46 Mod-5 NEARTIP ASW torpedo (1995) 1998-2005 (150) For KDX-1 (Kwanggaeto the Great) frigates and for 
ASROC ASW missiles on KDX-2 frigates 
  8 RH-800XP Reconnaissance ac 1996 2000-2001 (8) 'Paekdu/Peace Pioneer' deal worth $461 m; incl 4 RH-
800RA ground-surveillance and RH-800SIG SIGINT 
version; deal temporarily suspended in 1998 after 
corruption charges 
  13 AN/AQS-18 Dipping sonar 1997 1999-2001 (13) For 13 Super Lynx helicopters from UK 
  16 CT-7 Turboprop 1997 2001-2002 16 For 8 CN-235 transport aircraft from Indonesia; CT-7-
9C3 version 
  100 Popeye-1 ASM (1997) 2002 (100) Deal worth $125 m incl modernization of 30 F-4E 
combat aircraft; US designation AGM-142 
  3 AN/SPS-49 Air surv radar (1999) 2003-2005 3 For 3 KDX-2 frigates produced in South Korea; 
AN/SPS-49(V)5 version 
  6 LM-2500 Gas turbine (SH) (1999) 2003-2005 6 For 3 KDX-2 frigates produced in South Korea 
  (627) BGM-71 TOW Anti-tank missile 2000 2001 (627) Probably BGM-71E TOW-2A version 
  110 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM 2000 2003-2005 (110) $159 m deal; for KDX-2 frigates; SM-2MR Block-3A 
version 
  (4) Shadow-400 UAV 2000 2001-2002 (4)  
  111 MGM-140A1 ATACMS SSM 2001 2004 (111) Deal worth $81 m 
  (18) RGM-84 Harpoon Anti-ship missile (2001) 2003 (18)  
  64 RIM-116A RAM SAM 2001 2004-2005 (64) For KDX-2 frigates 
  (3) AGM-65G Maverick ASM (2002) 2003 (3) Version uncertain 
  147 AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM 2002 2005-2006 (147) Part of deal worth $110 m; for F-15K combat aircraft 
  3 AN/SPY-1D Air surv radar (2002)   For 3 KDX-3 destroyers produced in South Korea 
  29 M-270 MLRS 227mm MRL 2002 2002-2004 (29) $498 m deal 
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  (40) Tiger Eyes Aircraft El/Op system 2002 2005-2007 (20) $164 m deal; for F-15K combat aircraft 
  (45) AGM-84H SLAM-ER ASM (2003) 2006-2007 (36) $70 m deal; for F-15K combat aircraft 
  27 F-404 Turbofan (2003) 2006-2007 (22) $80 m deal; for 25 T-50 trainer aircraft produced in 
South Korea; F-404-GE-102 version 
  (14) JDAM Guided bomb 2003 2006 (14)  
  105 AIM-9X Sidewinder SRAAM 2004 2006-2007 (105) Part of $110 m deal; for F-15K combat aircraft 
  (125) RIM-116A RAM SAM (2004) 2007 (30) For KDX-3 destroyers and Dodko (LPX) AALS 
  8 P-3CUP Orion ASW/MP aircraft 2005 2007 (2) Ex-US; P-3B version rebuilt to P-3CUP in USA; $493 
m deal ($66 m for aircraft and $427 m for 
modernization); 1 more for spares only; delivery 
2007-2009 
  47 F-404 Turbofan (2006)   For 47 T-50 trainer and T-50 LIFT (TA-50) 
combat/trainer aircraft produced South Korea; 
delivery from 2008 
  26 RGM-84L Harpoon-2 Anti-ship missile 2006   $38 m deal; incl 20 AGM-84 and 6 UGM-84 version 
  (30) RIM-116A RAM SAM 2006 2007 30 $17.4 m deal; RIM-116A Block-1/HAS version 
  48 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2006)   $111 m deal; SM-2 Block-3B version; for KDX 
destroyers 
  (490) T-700 Turboshaft 2006   For 245 KHP helicopters produced in South Korea 
  102 AIM-9X Sidewinder SRAAM (2007)   Part of $55 m deal; for F-15K combat aircraft 
  210 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2007)   Contract possibly not yet signed 
  . . RIM-66/SM-3 SAM (2007)   For KDX-3 destroyers; contract not yet signed 
 
L:  12 F-100 Turbofan 1991 1998-2001 (12) 54% value produced in South Korean; spares for F-16 
combat aircraft 
  120 F-16C Block-50/52 FGA aircraft 1991 1994-2001 (120) $2.5 b 'Peace Bridge-2' or 'Korean Fighter Programme' 
(KFP) deal (incl production of components for all 120 
and 36 assembled from kits and 72 produced in South 
Korea; up to 51% value produced in South Korean); 
F-16 Block-52 version; incl some F-16D; South 
Korean designation KF-16 
  200 K-1A1/Type-88 Tank (1994) 2004-2007 (100) KRW1 tr ($781 m) deal; incl 2 or 3 prototypes 
  57 LVTP-7A1/AAV-7A1 APC 1995 1997-2001 (57) $91 m deal; incl 5 ARV and 4 CP version; South 
Korean designation KAAV (Korean Armoured 
Amphibious Vehicle) 
  3 Mk-45 127mm Naval gun 1999 2003-2005 3 $22 m deal; for 3 KDX-2 frigates produced in South 
Korea; Mk-45 Mod-4 version 
  4 AN/TPS-77 Air surv radar 2000 2002 (4) $54 m deal (offsets incl production of components in 
South Korea) 
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  20 F-16C Block-50/52 FGA aircraft 2000 2003-2004 (20) $663 m 'Korean Fighter Programme-2' (KFP-2) deal 
(78% value produced in South Korea); F-16 Block-52 
version; incl 5 F-16D; for use as reconnaissance 
aircraft; South Korean designation KF-16 
  67 LVTP-7A1/AAV-7A1 APC 2000 2001-2006 (67) $99-120 m deal; South Korean designation KAAV 
(Korean Armoured Amphibious Vehicle) 
  3 AN/TPS-77 Air surv radar 2002 2004 (3) $39 m deal (offsets incl production of components in 
South Korea) 
  40 F-15E Strike Eagle Fighter/bomber ac 2002 2005-2007 (30) $4.2 b 'F-X' programme (offsets 65-83% incl production 
of components for 32 F-15K and all production of 
AH-64 combat helicopter fuselages in South Korea); 
F-15K Slam Eagle version; option on 40 more; 
delivery 2005-2008 
  4 Boeing-737-7ES AEW&C aircraft 2006   $1.7 b 'E-X' programme (incl 3 partly produced in South 
Korea); deliver 2011-2012 
  20 F-15E Strike Eagle Fighter/bomber ac (2006)   Contract not yet signed; delivery 2009-2010 
  (100) LVTP-7/AAV-7 APC 2006 2006-2007 (23) KRW149 b ($157 m) deal; delivery 2006-2010 
  
Sri Lanka 
S: USA 2 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder Arty locating radar (2000) 2003-2004 (2) $22 m deal 
  1 Beech-200 HISAR AGS aircraft 2000 2002 1 For use against LTTE rebels 
  1 Reliance OPV 2004 2004 1 Ex-US; aid; modernized (for $6.9 m) before delivery 
  (1) Sea surv. radar Sea surv radar (2005) 2007 (1) Aid against LTTE rebels 
  
Taiwan 
S: USA (383) RIM-66B Standard-1MR SAM (1994) 1994-2001 (383) For Perry (Cheng Kung) frigates 
  300 M-60A3 Patton-2 Tank 1996 1998-2002 (300) Ex-US; deal worth $223 m 
  (21) Bell-209/AH-1W Combat helicopter 1997 2000-2002 (21) $479 m deal 
  1786 BGM-71 TOW Anti-tank missile 1997 1999-2001 (1786) Deal worth $80 m incl 114 launchers; BGM-71E TOW-
2A version 
  1299 FIM-92 Stinger Portable SAM 1997 1999-2001 (1299) $420 m deal (incl 74 Avenger SAM systems) 
  11 S-70B/SH-60B Seahawk ASW helicopter 1997 2000-2001 (11) S-70C(M)-2 Thunderhawk version 
  (14) AN/AAQ-13 LANTIRN Aircraft El/Op system 1998 2000-2001 (14) Part of deal worth $106 m; Sharpshooter version; for F-
16 combat aircraft 
  (14) AN/AAQ-14 LANTIRN Aircraft radar 1998 2000-2001 (14) Part of deal worth $106 m; Pathfinder version; for F-16 
combat aircraft 
  728 FIM-92 Stinger Portable SAM 1998 2000-2001 (728) $180 m deal (incl 61 launchers) 
  240 AGM-114K HELLFIRE Anti-tank missile 1999 2001 (240) $23 m deal; AGM-114K3 version 
  9 CH-47D Chinook Helicopter 1999 2002-2003 (9) Deal worth $300-486 m; CH-47SD version 
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  2 E-2C Hawkeye-2000 AEW&C aircraft 1999 2005 2 $400 m deal; E-2T/Hawkeye-2000 version 
  120 AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM 2000 2001-2003 (120) Deal worth $150 m; for F-16 combat aircraft; stored in 
USA until 2003 when delivered to Taiwan after China 
introduced similar AA-12 missiles in 2002/2003 
  302 MIM-72C Chaparral SAM 2000 2000-2005 (302) Ex-US; MIM-72E/G/J versions 
  40 AGM-65G Maverick ASM (2001) 2003 (40) Deal worth $18 m; for F-16 combat aircraft 
  (100) AGM-88 HARM Anti-radar missile (2001) 2002-2004 (100)  
  (71) RGM-84 Harpoon Anti-ship missile 2001 2002 71  
  11 AN/TPS-77 Air surv radar 2002 2004-2006 (11) Incl 4 AN/TPS-117 
  290 BGM-71F TOW-2B Anti-tank missile 2002 2003-2004 (290) $18 m deal 
  360 Javelin Anti-tank missile (2002) 2005 (360) $51 m deal (incl 40 launchers) 
  182 AIM-9L/M Sidewinder SRAAM 2003 2005-2006 (182) $17 m deal; AIM-9M-2 version 
  4 Kidd Destroyer (2003) 2005-2006 4 Ex-US; $740 m deal; Taiwanese designation Keelung 
  54 LVTP-7A1/AAV-7A1 APC 2003 2005 (54) $64-156 m deal; ex-US AAV-7A1 rebuilt to AAV-
7A1RAM/RS; incl 4 CP and 2 ARV version 
  (22) RGM-84L Harpoon-2 Anti-ship missile (2003) 2005-2006 (22) RGM-84L Block-2 version; for Kidd (Keelung) 
destroyers 
  (148) RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2003) 2005-2006 (148) SM-2 Block-3A version; for Kidd (Keelung) destroyers 
  (449) AGM-114K HELLFIRE Anti-tank missile (2004)   Part of $50 m deal; AGM-114M3 version 
  5 AIM-7M Sparrow BVRAAM 2005 2007 (5) Part of $280 m deal; for training in USA 
  10 AIM-9L/M Sidewinder SRAAM 2005 2006 (10) Part of $280 m deal; AIM-9M version; for training in 
USA 
  1 AN/BOND Air surv radar 2005   Part of $752 m deal; delivery by 2009 
  (1400) C-9 Diesel engine (AV) (2005) 2007 (20) For 1400 CM-32 APC/IFV produced in Taiwan 
  3 S-92/H-92 Superhawk Helicopter (2006)   For SAR; contract not yet signed 
  235 AGM-65G Maverick ASM (2007)   Contract possibly not yet signed 
  (30) AH-64D Apache Combat helicopter (2007)   Contract not yet signed 
  218 AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM (2007)   Contract possibly not yet signed 
  . . MIM-104 PAC-3 SAM (2007)   Contract not yet signed 
  (12) P-3CUP Orion ASW/MP aircraft (2007)   Ex-US P-3 rebuilt to P-3CUP (incl 8-10 in Taiwan); 
contract not yet signed 
  144 RIM-66M Standard-2 SAM (2007)   Contract not yet signed 
 
L:  8 Perry/FFG-7 Frigate 1989 1993-2004 8 'Kwang Hua-1' project; order for last 1 delayed from 
1997 to 2001 for financial reasons; Taiwanese 
designation Cheng Kung 





S: USA 6 M-88A2 HERCULES ARV (1998) 2000-2001 (6)  
  16 F-16A FGA aircraft 2000 2002-2003 (16) Ex-US; $130-157 m 'Peace Naresuan-4' deal; 
modernized before delivery; incl 1 F-16B; incl 2 more 
for spares only 
  8 AIM-120C AMRAAM BVRAAM (2001) 2003 (8) $6.1 m deal; for F-16 combat aircraft; acquired as 
reaction to Myanmarese order for MiG-29 combat 
aircraft; stored in USA until 2003 when delivered to 
Thailand after China and Viet Nam introduced similar 
AA-12 missiles in 2002/2003 
  30 Bell-205/UH-1 Huey-2 Helicopter 2001 2002-2004 (30) Ex-US UH-1H rebuilt to Huey-2; aid 
  3 S-70/UH-60L Blackhawk Helicopter 2001 2001-2002 (3) $30-36 m deal; for patrol and anti-narcotics operations 
along border with Myanmar 
  4 T-800 Turboshaft 2001 2004 4 For 2 Super Lynx-300 helicopters from UK 
  (4) S-70/UH-60L Blackhawk Helicopter 2003 2004-2005 4 THB3 b deal 
  7 Bell-209/AH-1F Combat helicopter (2005)   Ex-US; aid (Thailand to pay THB300 m ($7.1 m) for 
overhaul and transport) 
  3 SeaVue MP aircraft radar (2005) 2006 (1) For modernization of 3 P-3T ASW/MP aircraft 
  1 AN/TPS-77 Air surv radar 2007    
  6 F-404 Turbofan (2007)   For 6 JAS-39 Gripen combat aircraft from Sweden 











B. PRC ARMS TRANSFERS 
Transfers of major conventional weapons: sorted by recipient. Deals with 
deliveries or orders made for year range 2001 to 2007 
Note: The ‘No. delivered/produced’ and the ‘Year(s) of deliveries’ columns refer to all deliveries since the beginning of the contract. Deals in which the recipient 
was involved in the production of the weapon system are listed separately. The ‘Comments’ column includes publicly reported information on the value of the 
deal. Information on the sources and methods used in the collection of the data, and explanations of the conventions, abbreviations and acronyms, can be found at 
URL <http://armstrade.sipri.org/>. The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database is continuously updated as new information becomes available. 
Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database 
Information generated: 15 November 2008 
 
   
Recipient/    Year Year(s) No.  
 supplier (S) No. Weapon Weapon of order/ of delivered/  




S: China (21) HN-5A Portable SAM (2000) 2001 21 HN-5JA1 version 
  (114) Red Arrow-8 Anti-tank missile (2000) 2001 114  
  20 Type-83 122mm Towed gun (2003) 2004 20  
  1 Crotale SAM system (2004) 2007 (1) FM-90 version; for DW-2000 frigate 
  (69) PL-7 SRAAM (2004) 2005-2006 69 For F-7MG combat aircraft 
  . . QW-2 Portable SAM 2004 2006-2007 (100)  
  . . C-801/C-802 CDS Coast defence system (2005)   Status uncertain 
  (65) D-30 122mm Towed gun (2005) 2006 (65) Type-96 version 
  . . PL-9 SRAAM (2005) 2006 10 For F-7MG combat aircraft 
  (20) R-440 Crotale SAM (2005) 2007 (20) FM-90 version; for DW-2000 frigate 
  16 F-7MG Fighter aircraft (2006) 2006 16 $44-118 m deal; F-7BG version 
  
Cambodia 
S: China (6) Type-062/Shanghai Patrol craft 2005 2005 (6) Designation uncertain; ex-Chinese; aid 




S: China 3 C-802/CSS-N-8/Saccade Anti-ship missile 2005 2006 3 Part of $11.2 deal; for FAC 
  
Myanmar (Burma) 
S: China (5) Rice Lamp Fire control radar (1991) 2002-2003 (5) For 5 Myanmar patrol craft produced in Myanmar 
  (5) Type-76 37mm Naval gun turret (1991) 1998-2002 (5) For 5 Myanmar patrol craft produced in Myanmar 
  (3) Type-344 Fire control radar (1996) 2004-2005 (3) For 3 Myanmar FAC produced in Myanmar 
  (25) C-801/CSS-N-4/Sardine Anti-ship missile (2001) 2004-2005 (24) For Myanmar FAC produced in Myanmar 
 
L:  (3) Sinmalaik Corvette (1997) 2001-2003 (3)  
  
Nepal 
S: China (5) WZ-551 APC 2005 2005 (5)  
  1 MA-60 Transport aircraft 2007    
  
Sri Lanka 
S: China 6 K-8 Karakorum-8 Trainer/combat ac (2000) 2001 6  
  (3) CEIEC-408C Air surv radar 2004 2004-2006 (3) Designation uncertain; incl for civilian air traffic control 
  3 K-8 Karakorum-8 Trainer/combat ac (2004) 2005 3  
  1 JY-11 Air surv radar (2007)    
  
Thailand 
S: China 2 Pattani Frigate 2002 2005-2006 2 EUR75-80 m ($66-95 m) deal 
  (50) C-802/CSS-N-8/Saccade Anti-ship missile (2007)   Contract not yet signed 
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APPENDIX C. PLA DIPLOMACY ACTIVITIES 
Country Year Activity Type Description 
Bangladesh 2005 Regional 
On the military front, Genreal Liang Guanglie, Chief of 
General Staff of the People's Liberation Army, visited 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh Chief of Naval Staff, Principal 
Staff Officer of Armed Forces Division of PM Office, and 
Director General of Directorate Genera of Forces 
Intelligence visited China. 
Bangladesh 2005 Strategic-level activities 
In May, China's Chief of General Staff visits Bangladesh. In 
July, Bangladesh's Chief of Naval Staff visits China. 
Bangladesh 2006 Regional In May, the Chief of Army Staff of Bangladesh visits China 
Brunei 
Darussalam 2004 Regional 
Major General Halbi, Commander of the Armed Forces of 
Brunei, observed the “Iron Fist-2004” Military Exercise 
during his visit to China. In November, General Qian 
Guoliang, Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, 






In October, Brunei's Deputy Minister of Defense visits 
China.  
Cambodia 2004 Regional 
Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian Royal Armed 
Forces General Ke Kim Yan and Director General of 
National Police General Hok Lundy also paid separate visit 
to China 
Cambodia 2005 Regional Commissioner General of the National Police visited China 
Cambodia #### Regional 
A delegation of senior military officers headed by Lt. 
General Meas Sophea, Deputy Armed Forces, visited China 
a study mission. A hospital built with Chinese grant was 
completed and transferred to the Cambodian Royal Armed 
Forces. 
D.P.R.K 2004 Regional 
National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il paid 
an informal visit to China. General secretary Kim Jong Il 
also met with Chairman of the CPC Central Military 
Commission Jiang Zemin 
D.P.R.K 2005 Regional Deputy Chief, General Political Bureau and Peoples' Army made visit to China from April 19 - 23. 
D.P.R.K 2005 Regional 
On 28-30 October, at the invitation of the General Secretary 
of the Worker's Party of Korea and Chairman of the National 
Defense Commission Kim Jong Il, CCCPC General 
secretary and President of PRC Hu Jintao paid an official 
good-will visit to the DPRK. 
D.P.R.K 2006 Regional In April, China's Minister of National Defense visits D.P.R.K 
D.P.R.K #### Regional 
First Vice Chairman of the D.P.R.K. National Defense 
Commission Jo Myong Rok visited China and was received 
by President Hu Jintao. 
D.P.R.K #### Regional 
General Xu Caihou, member of the CPCCC Secretariat and 
the CPC Central Military Commission visited D.P.R.K and 
was received by Secretary Kim Jong Il 
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Regional WPK General Secretary and National Defense Commission 
Chairman Kim Jong Il visited China 









Exchanges in the military grew steadily. Held second round 
of counter-terrorism consultation. Also had official visit in 
June 2003 to China by Prime Minister Vajpayee and was 
met by President Hu Jintao, Central Military Commission 
Chairman Jiang Zemin.  





Military exchanges and cooperation made steady progress. 
In March, Vice Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission and Defense Minister General Cao Gangchuan 
paid a visit to India and the two sides agreed on further 
strengthening the friendly cooperation between their armed 
forces. Chinese Academy of Military Science and National 
Defense University delegations visited India. In December, 
India's Chief of Army Staff General NC Vij visited China. 
Indian Air Force and army delegations also visited China. 
Border troops on the two sides carried out a joint mountain-
climbing exercise 
India 2005 Strategic-level activities 
In March, the 15th Meeting of the China-India Joint 
Working Group on the Boundary Question and the 15th 
Meeting of Diplomatic and Military Experts Group were 
convened in Beijing. In April, the two government signed 
the Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of 
Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along 
the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas. 
India 2005 Regional 
Military exchanges and security cooperation grew steadily. 
In May General Liang Guanglie, Member of the CPC 
Central Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff 
of PLA, paid an Official goodwill visit to India. The two 
countries agreed to enhance bilateral military exchanges and 
cooperation. In September, both countries signed an MOU 
for cooperation. In December, a naval fleet of China paid a 
goodwill visit to the Cochin Port of India. The two navies 
staged a joint air/sea search and rescue exercise coded 
“Sino-Indian Friendship 2005” in the Indian Ocean. 
India 2006 Regional 
In May/June, India's Minister of Defense visits China. In 
October, China's Commander of PLA Air Force visits India. 
IN November/December, China's Political Commissar of 
Chengdu Military Area Command visits India 
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Country Year Activity Type Description 
India #### Regional 
Military exchanges made steady progress. In April, Defense 
minister George Fernandees visited China, and the two sides 
pledged the readiness to develop a friendly relationship 
between China and India. Later, He made two donations of 
US$200,000 worth of medicines and equipment on behalf of 
the Indian Government and its Defense Ministry for China's 
ongoing fight against SARS. At the end of 2003, an Indian 
naval fleet made a friendly port call at Shanghai, and later 
joined the Chinese navy in a search and rescue exercise in 
the East China Sea off the coast of Shanghai. This was the 
first joint exercise by the two navies in the non-traditional 
security field. The strengthened ties between the two 
militaries was evidenced by the increased number of visits, 
such as the visits to India by Deputy Chief of General 
University delegations, and teh visit to China's Tibet 
Autonomous Regional by Commander of India's Fourth 





Exchanges between the military, police were strengthened. 
Army's Chief of Staff Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu and 
Director of the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency 
Maj. Gen. Luthfie visited China on separate occasions. 
Indonesia 2004 Regional 
Bilateral exchanges in the military...became more active. 
Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Air Force General Chappy 
Hakim visited China 
Indonesia 2005 Regional 
China and Indonesia reached agreement on establishing a 
defense consultation mechanism and signed the MOU on 
Research and Development in Defense Technological 
Cooperation Between the Commission of Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defense of the 
People's Republic of China and the Ministry of Cooperation 
Between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of 
Indonesia. 
Indonesia 2006 Regional 
In May, China's Assistant Chief of General Staff visits 
Indonesia and held the first China-Indonesia Defense and 
Security Consultation. In July, Indonesia's Chief of Army 
Staff visits China 
Japan 2003 Regional 
China and Japan conducted fruitful cooperation in 
safeguarding regional peace and stability and promoting 





Military-to-Military exchange continued to develop. In 
January and October, General Xiong Guangkai, Deputy 
Chief of General Staff of the People's Liberation Army of 
China and Takemasa Moriya, Administrative Vice Minister 
of Japan Defense Agency held the 4th and 5th China-Japan 
defense departments security consultations in Beijing and 
Tokyo. Armed forces of the two countries also conducted a 
series of exchanges. The countries continued to utilize ARF, 
10+3 summit and other multilateral channels to press ahead 
with their pragmatic cooperation 
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Country Year Activity Type Description 
Japan 2005 Strategic-level activities 
On March 24, Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff 
General Xiong Guangkai and Japanese Vice Defense 
Minister Takemasa Moriya held the sixth China-Japan 
consultation on defense security in Beijing. The two sides 
had in-depth exchanges of views on regional and 
international security situations, defense policies, bilateral 
relations and defense affairs. 
Japan 2006 Regional and Strategic 
In November/December, China's Assistant Chief of General 






Military-to-Military exchanges were reumed in an all-round 
way. Japan's Defense Agency Chief Shiger Ishiba visited 
China on September, the first visit of its kind since 1998. 
and the two sides agreed on furhter increasing their 
chanages. A number of exchange programs were pursued by 
the two militaries 
Kazakhstan 2005 Strategic-level activities 
Bilateral exchanges in military and security areas continued 
to develop. In May, State Councilor and Minister of Public 
Security Zhou Yongkang visited Kazakhstan at the invitation 
of its government and the two sides signed the Agreement of 
Cooperation Between the Government of the People's 
Republic of China and the Government of th eRepublic of 
Kazakhstan on Jointly Combating Crimes. In June, he 
attended the Meeting of Secretaries of the SCO Security 
Meeting in Astana. In September, Vice Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission, State councilor and Defense 
Minister General Cao Gangchuan visited Kazakhstan upon 
invitation. In June, Kazak Interior Minister Zautbek 
Turisbekov visited China. In July Deputy Minister of 
Defense Abay Tasblatov visited China at the head of a 
delegation to observe the China-Russia joint military 
exercise. In August, Deputy Ministers of Kazakhstan visits 
China. In September, China's Minister of National Defense 
visits Kazakhstan. 
Kazakhstan 2006 Regional In April, Kazakhstan's Deputy Minister of Defense visits China 
Kyrgyzstan 2003 Regional Defense Minister Esen Topoev visited China and met with Vice Premier Huang Ju 
Kyrgyzstan 2005 Strategic-level activities 
Captain Kurmanov of the National Guards paid a visit to 
China. From March 18-21 and August, Minister of Defense 
from Kyrgyzstan visits China 
Kyrgyzstan 2006 Regional 
In March, the Commander of the Border Forces of 
Kyrgyzstan visits China. In April, Minister of Defense of 
Kygyzstan visits China. 
Laos 2003 Regional 
June 12-14 at the invitation of Presiden and CCCPC 
General-Secretary Hu Jintao, President of Laos and 
Chairman of the Lao People's Revolution Party (LPRP) 
Khamtay Siphandone paid a state visit to China. President 
Hu Hintoa, Central Military Commission Chirman Jiang 
Zemin met with him on separate occasions.  
Laos 2006 Regional In October, China's Chief of General Staff visits Laos 
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Country Year Activity Type Description 
Malaysia 2003 Regional 
September, General Liang Guanglie, Member of the Central 
Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff of the 
People's Liberation Army, visited Malaysia. Cooperation in 
military deepened 
Malaysia 2004 Regional Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission General Guo Boxiong also had a transit stopover in Malaysia 
Malaysia 2005 Strategic-level activities 
Minister of Defense Dato'Seri Najib Tun Razak visited 
China, where he met with Premier Wen Jaibao and Vice 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Minister 
of Defense General Cao Gangchuan. In September both 
sides signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense 
Cooperation and agreed to launch the defense and security 
Consultation mechanism as soon as possible. The two sides 
also held activities commemorating the 600th anniversary of 
Zheng He's maritime expedition. 
Malaysia 2006 Regional 
In April, China's Minister of National Defense visits 
Malaysia. In May, China's Assistant Chief of General Staff 
visits Malaysia. In May, Malaysia's Commander of the 
Armed Forces visits China and held the first China-Malaysia 
Defense Consultation. In June, Malaysia's Commander of 
the Navy visits China 
Mongolia 2005 Regional 
In July, Mongolian Minister of Defense visits China 
Myanmar 2003 Regional 
In August, Vice Senior General Maung Aye, SpDC Vice 
Chairman and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Defense 
Armed Forces, visited China and called on President Hu 
Jintao. In November, at the invitation of the Chinese 
People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, 
Brigadier General Aung Thein Lin and Brigadier General 
Yan Thein, Mayors of Yangkon and Mandalay respectively, 
visited China 
Myanmar 2006 Regional In October, China's Chief of General Staff visits Myanmar 
Nepal 2003 Regional 
Secretary of the Ministry of Defense Madan Prasad Aryal 
and Lt. General Victory SJB Rana, Chief of Staff of Royal 
Napalese Army, visited China in April and October 
Nepal 2005 Regional In October, Nepal's Chief of General Staff visits China. 
Pakistan 2004 
Cooperation with 





In March, General Cao Gangchuan, Vice Chairman of teh 
Central Military Commission and also State Councilor and 
Minister of Defense, paid a visit to Pakistan. In May, 
Admiral Shahid Karimullah, Chief of General Staff of th 
Pakistani Navy, paid a visit to China. In August, armed 
forces of the two countries conducted a joint counter-
terrorist exercise code named “Friendship-2004”. 
Pakistan 2005 Regional January 10-14: Minister of Defense of Pakistan visits China 
Pakistan 2005 
Cooperation with 





The two countries signed the Agreement on Cooperation in 
Combating Terrorism, Secessionism and Extremism. 
Pakistan 2005 Strategic-level activities 
In April 4 - 11, China-Pakistan held the 3rd Defense 
Security Consultation 
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Country Year Activity Type Description 
Pakistan 2005 Regional 
Two countries maintained friendly military-to-military 
cooperation and exchanges. In September, Gen. Ehsan Ul 
Haq, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of 
Pakistan, headed a delegation to visit China. In November, a 
Chinese naval craft formation visited Pakistan and joined, 
for the first time, the Pakistani navy in a military exercise in 
non-traditional security in the Arab Sea, with its main part 
being joint search and rescue operations. 
Pakistan 2006 Regional and Strategic 
In May, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff visits China. In 
August, China's Assistant Chief of General Staff visits 
Pakistan and held the 4th China-Pakistan Defense and 
Security Consultation in Islamabad. In October, China's 
Commander of PLA Air Force visits Pakistan. In December, 
China and Pakistan held a joint Counter Terrorism Military 
Exercise at Abbottabad, Pakistan 
Philippines 2003 Regional 
In December, a Chinese military delegation led by General 
Chen Bingde, Commander of the Jinan Military Area 
Command, visited Philippines 
Philippines 2004 Regional 
Philippines' National Defense Minister Avelino J Cruz JR. 
And Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces General Narciso 
Abaa visited China respectively in November and September
Philippines 2005 Strategic-level activities 
Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff General Xiong 
Guangkai visited the Philippines in May and officially 
launched the defense and security consultation mechanism 
between the two countries. Vice Director of the PLA 
General Logistics Department Lieutenant General Wang 
Qian paid a working visit to the Philippines in July. 
Philippines 2006 Regional and Strategic 
In May, Philippines' Chief of General Staff, Armed Forces, 
visits China. Between August and November, port calls was 
made by China's PLA naval ships to the Philippines. In 
October, China-Philippines held the 2nd Defense and 
Security Consultation in Beijing 
ROK 2005 Strategic-level activities 
In March/April, Minister of Defense of Korea visits China. 
In July, Chief of General Staff, Korean Air Force visited 
China. In September, Port call by Korean naval ships. 
ROK 2006 Regional 
In April, China's Minister of National Defense visits ROK. 









Members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization met in 
Moscow and set up the Anti-terrorism Structure 
Russia 2004 
Cooperation with 





China and Russia worked together to facilitate the 
development of the SCO, and joined other members in 
successfully launching the SCO Secretariat and Regional 
Anti-terrorism Structure. 
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Country Year Activity Type Description 
Russia 2005 Strategic-level activities 
Two countries held two successful rounds of strategic 
security consultation. On March 14-17 the Assistant Chief of 
the General Staff visited Russia. Following the visit, Russia's 
Chief of the General Staff visited China from 17-20 March. 
On May 25 - June 8, Commander, Jinan Military Area 
Command visits Russia. In June, China's Assistant Chief of 
General Staff visits Russia. In September, China and Russia 
held the 9th Consultation between the General Staff 
Headquarters 
Russia 2005 Regional 
Success in the first China-Russia joint military exercise. In 
August, China and Russia held “Peace Mission 2005” joint 
military exercise, the first of its kind between the two 
countries. The two sides conducted real-combat drills 
following the theme of combating the “three evils” of 
terrorism, separatism and extremism and jointly responding 
to various crises. This exercise further enhanced military 
cooperation and strategic coordination between the two 
countries. To celebrate the 10th anniversary of China-Russia 
strategic coordination partnership, the Chinese side 
suggested that the two countries should...expand military 
exchanges and cooperation, work hard to ensure the success 
of the first China-Russia joint military exercise and make 
vigorous preparation for the future. In September, China's 
Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chief of General 
Staff visits Russia separately. 
Russia 2006 Regional and Strategic 
In March, Russian Army Commander visits China. In April, 
Russian Minister of Defense visits China. In May, China's 
Chief of General Staff visits Russia. In May, China's 
Political Commissar of Lanzhou Military Area Command 
visits Russia. In May/June, 10th Consultation Between the 
General Staff Headquarters of China and Russia was held in 
Beijing. In October, China's Assistant Chief of General Staff 
visits Russia and held the Consultation on the SCO Joint 
Anti-Terrorism Exercise 
Russia 1996 and 1997 
Strategic-level 
activities 
Agreements were signed with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan on enhancing trust in the military fields along the 
border areas and on mutual reduction of military forces 
along the border areas and, in doing so, pioneered a ne 
security concept featuring mutual trust, benefits, equality 
and cooperation  
Singapore 2004 Regional 
In November, Preisdent Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao 
met with Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong during the APEC 
in Chile and ASEAN plus China (10 + 1) Summit in Laos 
Singapore 2005 Regional In November, Singapore's Minister of Defense visits China. 
Singapore 2006 Regional In February/March, port call by Singapore naval ships in China 
Singapore 2006 Regional 
In April, China's Minister of National Defense visits 
Singapore. In July, Singapore’s Chief of General Staff visits 
China 
Sri Lanka 2004 Strategic-level activities 
On September 6 - 15, a foreign affairs delegation of the 
Chinese People's Liberation Army paid a visit to Sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka 2005 Strategic-level activities 
In August/September, President and Minister of Defense of 
Sri Lanka visits China. 
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Country Year Activity Type Description 
Tajikistan 2005 Regional 
In June, Tajikistan's Commander of the National Guard 
visits China. In September, General Cao Gangchuan, Vice 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, State 
Councilor and Defense Minister, visited Tajikistan. In 
August, Ministers of Defense of Tajikistan visits China. In 
September, China's Minister of National Defense visits 
Tajikistan. In October, First Deputy Minister of Defense 
Major General Adakhamov visited China. 
Tajikistan 2006 Regional 
In April, Tajikistan's Minister of Defense visits China. In 
September, China's Deputy Chief of General Staff visits 
Tajikistan. Also in September, China and Tajikistan 
conducted a joint Counter Terrorism Military Exercise at 
Hatlon Prefecture, Tajikistan 
Thailand 2003 Regional The two defense ministries held their second annual security consultation 
Thailand 2004 Regional 
General Cao Gangchuan, Vice Chairman of the Central 
Military Commission, and Minister of National Defense 
visited Thailand 
Thailand 2005 Strategic-level activities 
In July, Thailand's Assistant Minister of Defense visits 
China. Also, two defense ministries held the fourth annual 
security consultation and conducted the first joint military 
training. China's naval fleet visited Thailand and held the 5th 
Annual Defense and Security Consultation between the 
Defense Ministries of China and Thailand. In December, 
China and Thailand conducted a joint Maritime search-and-
rescue exercise in the non-traditional security field. 
Thailand 2006 Regional and Strategic 
In May, Thailand's Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces visits China. In July, Thailand's Air Force 
Commander visits China. In August, China's Assistant Chief 
of General Staff visits Thailand and held the 5th Annual 
Defense and Security Consultation between the Defense 
Ministries of China and Thailand. In October, China's Chief 
of General Staff visits Thailand. In November/December, 
China's Assistant Chief of General Staff visits Thailand 
Timor-Leste 2003 
Cooperation with 





China continued to support the United Nation's work in East 
Timor. As of year-end 2003, China had dispatched a total of 
194 peacekeeping civilian police to East Timor. UNMISET 
Chief Kamalesh Sharma paid a working visit to China in 
November at the invitation of the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
Uzbekistan 2004 
Cooperation with 





Fight against the “three forces” of terrorism, extremism and 
separatism 
Uzbekistan 2005 Regional In August, Defense Minister visited China. In December, Uzbekistan's Minister of Defense visits China. 
Uzbekistan 2006 Regional In April, Uzbekistan's Minister of Defense visits China 
Viet Nam 2003 Regional 
In October, General Phung Quang Thanh, Cheif of the 
General Staff of the Vietnamese People's Army, visited 
China, during which the two defense ministries signed a 
cooperation protocol. 
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Country Year Activity Type Description 
Viet Nam 2005 Strategic-level activities 
In April, the two defense ministries held the first defense and 
security consultation. In July, Viet Nam's Deputy Minister of 
Defense visits China. In October, China's President of 
National Defense University visits Viet Nam. Also in the 
same month, Vietnamese Defense Minister Pham Van Tra 
visited China and the two sides signed the Agreement on 
Joint Patrol in Beibu Gulf Between Naval Forces of China 
and Viet Nam.  
Viet Nam 2006 Regional 
In April, China's Minister of National Defense visits Viet 
Nam. In October, Vietnam's Chief of General Political 
Department, People's Army, visits China. In 
November/December, China's Political Commissar of 
Chengdu Military Area Command visits Viet Nam. In 
November/December, China's Assistant Chief of General 
Staff visits Viet Nam and held the 2nd China-Vietnam 
Defense and Security Consultation 
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